The counterinsurgency policies of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party of India and the Naxalite insurgency by Christian, Nilesh J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-12
The counterinsurgency policies of the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata party of India and
the Naxalite insurgency
Christian, Nilesh J.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICIES OF THE 
HINDU NATIONALIST BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY 








Thesis Co-Advisors:  Anshu N. Chatterjee 
  Tristan J. Mabry 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICIES OF THE HINDU NATIONALIST 
BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY OF INDIA AND THE NAXALITE 
INSURGENCY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Nilesh J. Christian 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Over the last six decades, the Naxalite insurgency has spread to over 40 percent of India and survived 
multiple administrations. The Naxalites adopted a flexible approach, using the government’s neglect of 
Dalits and tribal peoples to its advantage. By 2006, the Indian National Congress (INC) government 
declared the insurgency a great threat to national security but implemented only half-hearted 
counterinsurgency efforts. In 2014, the Hindu nationalist party (Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) came to 
power with the promise of aggressively dealing with the Naxalites. This thesis examines the BJP’s 
counterinsurgency policies and practice in comparison to its election rhetoric. Since 2014, the BJP has 
implemented a holistic and balanced approach in its multipronged counterinsurgency strategies by using 
security, good governance, development, peace talks, and amnesty. The government is allocating needed 
resources to implement its strategy effectively. In the last two years, Naxalite violence has decreased, 
although the government still faces many challenges such as coordinating efforts and controlling 
corruption and other unlawful activities. However, in comparison to the INC, the BJP’s counterinsurgency 
approach is more pragmatic and resourceful. It is attempting to solve the underlying causes of discontent 
among the indigenous people by supporting political, economic, and social justice. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, Hindu, nationalism, Hinduism, Hindutva, 
Indian National Congress, INC, Naxalite insurgency, Communist, Maoist, policies, 
counterinsurgency, insurgency, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, West 
Bengal, hawkish 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
129 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICIES OF THE HINDU NATIONALIST 




Nilesh J. Christian 
Major, United States Air Force  
M.S., University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2008 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  





















Dr. Mohammed Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




Over the last six decades, the Naxalite insurgency has spread to over 40 percent of 
India and survived multiple administrations. The Naxalites adopted a flexible approach, 
using the government’s neglect of Dalits and tribal peoples to its advantage. By 2006, the 
Indian National Congress (INC) government declared the insurgency a great threat to 
national security but implemented only half-hearted counterinsurgency efforts. In 2014, 
the Hindu nationalist party (Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) came to power with the 
promise of aggressively dealing with the Naxalites. This thesis examines the BJP’s 
counterinsurgency policies and practice in comparison to its election rhetoric. Since 
2014, the BJP has implemented a holistic and balanced approach in its multipronged 
counterinsurgency strategies by using security, good governance, development, peace 
talks, and amnesty. The government is allocating needed resources to implement its 
strategy effectively. In the last two years, Naxalite violence has decreased, although the 
government still faces many challenges such as coordinating efforts and controlling 
corruption and other unlawful activities. However, in comparison to the INC, the BJP’s 
counterinsurgency approach is more pragmatic and resourceful. It is attempting to solve 
the underlying causes of discontent among the indigenous people by supporting political, 
economic, and social justice. 
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Since gaining independence from the British Empire, India has become adept at 
dealing with internal conflicts and insurgencies, specifically with the Tamils and Sikhs. 
However, India continues to struggle to contain its oldest Maoist movement, known as 
the Naxalite insurgency, which emerged in the 1960s. The Naxalite insurgency is mostly 
unknown around the world and within India (outside of Naxal-hit areas); and various 
administrations have struggled to eliminate it. The main objective of this thesis is to 
examine the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) administration’s approach and policies 
toward the Naxalite insurgency, as it considered a more hawkish party.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The focus of this research is to study the policies of the BJP government toward 
the Naxalite insurgency comparatively, primarily in five Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha (formerly Orissa), and West Bengal.  
This thesis studies counter-insurgency policies of the central government run by 
the BJP and BJP-dominated National Democratic Alliance (1998–2004 and 2014 to the 
present) and the Indian National Congress (INC) and INC-dominated United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) governments (1990–1998, 2005–2014). How did the political setting and 
priorities shape these administrations’ Naxalite policies, and specifically, how did these 
policies affect or shape the five states?  
What are the differences, if any, between the Hindu nationalist administration’s 
approaches when compared to the strategies of the previous governments? This thesis 
shows whether the BJP’s Hindu nationalist ideology drives its counterinsurgency efforts. 
The focus of this thesis is to understand the hawkish approach of the BJP 
government toward the five-decades-old problem. This study is important because it 
provides insight into the politics of the BJP’s election promises and the actual execution 
thereof. Also, it helps to analyze how the Hindu nationalist ideology influences the BJP’s 
approach to counter the Naxalite insurgency.  
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The Naxalite insurgency is a Maoist movement with roots in pre-independent 
India. In the post-independent era, this insurgency spread through multiple states and 
occupies about 35 percent of India. In December 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
identified the Naxalite insurgency as “the single biggest security challenge to the Indian 
state.”1 The Indian government then, led by the INC party, was able to keep the 
insurgency under control. However, over the last 15 years, the insurgency has regained 
momentum.  
In India, Hindu nationalism emerged during the independence movement against 
British rule. In 1984, the BJP was created after the fall of the Janata Dal government and 
collapse of the Jana Sangh. The BJP is notorious for its aggressive and hawkish approach 
against its rivals: Muslims, other minorities, and hostile neighbors.2 The BJP is a member 
of the Sangh Parivar, a family of organizations.3 The Sangh Parivar comprises many 
rightwing Hindu organizations including the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; 
National Volunteer Organization), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP; World Hindu 
Council), and the Bajrang Dal. With the help of the Sangh Parivar, the BJP has used 
various tactics, from socio-economic to socio-religious platforms to emerge as a powerful 
national party. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the BJP was finally able to capture a 
clear majority. Little to no written material is available on the BJP policies against 
insurgencies since its rise to national level politics is fairly new. Since the BJP came to 
power of its own strength, it does not have to depend on other political parties for 
creating its policies for national and international issues, which was the case in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The BJP has been in power for only two years; therefore, no major studies are 
available about its Naxalite counterinsurgency policies.  
                                                 
1 Manmohan Singh, “Prime Minister’s Speech” (speech, The Chief Minister’s Conference on Internal 
Security, New Delhi, India, December 20, 2007), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/ 
papers/20071220pmspeech.htm. 
2 Matthew Blake Fehrs, “Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling: Government Unity, Hawkishness 
and Military Challenges” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2008), http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http:// 
search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/304635228?accountid=12702.  
3 “BJP History,” accessed August 30, 2016, http://www.bjp.org/en/about-the-party/history?u=bjp-
history.  
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The Naxalite insurgency has been around for a long time, but it had never been a 
threat to national security. However, that situation has changed in the last few years, as 
the insurgency has expanded in many other areas of India. More importantly, India has 
become an economic powerhouse with a rising need for natural resources. The Naxalites 
occupy mineral-rich areas, including lands replete with iron ore. Therefore, the Naxalite 
insurgency is as an obstacle for India’s economic growth and threat to national security.4 
This thesis focuses on how Hindu nationalists and their affiliates influence policies 
toward Naxalites.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide the theoretical framework for 
this research and to analyze the literature for historical policies and approaches of India’s 
central and affected state governments toward the growing Naxalite insurgency. This 
literature review begins with the proposed democratic theory of peace process and state 
responses to radical elements. Then, it reviews scholarly literature on Naxalite 
insurgencies, the BJP’s Hindu nationalistic views and politics, and the central 
government’s approaches.  
1. Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Democracies  
In the field manual titled Counterinsurgency, the Department of the Army defines 
insurgency as:  
an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. … [or] an 
organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or 
other political authority while increasing insurgent control.5  
This field manual defines counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
                                                 
4 Keith J. Harnetiaux, “The Resurgence of Naxalism: How Great a Threat to India?” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 62, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10335. 
5 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2006), 1–1.  
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insurgency.”6 Since each insurgency is different, no single approach exists. Each 
government has to use appropriate measures to defeat its unique insurgencies. According 
to David Kilcullen, “These measures may be political, administrative, military, economic, 
psychological, of informational, and are almost always used in combination.”7 According 
to these definitions, each insurgency requires a unique and combined counterinsurgency 
approach.  
Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki argue that insurgency has been and will 
continue to be an issue for democratic and non-democratic governments, and the rise and 
fall of an insurgency depends on the government’s approach.8 When a government 
ignores the rising dissent in a particular group or community of people, discontent 
eventually builds up and leads to an insurgency.9 These people are either being 
suppressed by bad governance or unjustly treated by particular social or economic 
systems. Insurgencies have been around for centuries in one form or another. Some 
governments are very good at countering insurgencies by political and military means. 
However, most governments do not know how to deal with an uprising before it becomes 
a serious threat and an out-of-control insurgency. Connable and Libicki argue that most 
of the time, “governments defeat themselves more often than they are defeated by a 
dominant insurgency.”10 Connable and Libicki give five reasons for government failure: 
the government fails to recognize a credible threat or ignores it, undermines root causes 
of discontent, applies half-hearted solutions to address problems or too late to address 
issues, does not identify major shifts in strategic momentum, fails to provide government 
control in rural areas, or becomes dependent on a unpredictable sponsor.11  
According to Connable and Libicki, democratic governments like other systems 
tend to use the military to defeat insurgencies in the battlefield, but this approach is 
                                                 
6 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5). 
7 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.  
8 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 
151–156. 
9 Ibid., 152.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
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mostly counterproductive.12 The authors argue that military actions result in civilian 
casualties and suffering, which can further fuel anti-government sentiments and cumulate 
in support for insurgency groups among the local people. Militants use this type of event 
for recruiting propaganda. If a government wants to end an insurgency positively and 
permanently, Connable and Libicki prescribe that it must win the hearts and minds by 
bringing about social, economic, and political changes.13 They further suggest a 
government needs to recognize the conflict and to find a source of discontent that 
addresses issues by “conducting a well-timed, aggressive, fully resourced, population-
centric campaign.”14  
Atul Kohli argues that in a democracy, most insurgencies or self-determination 
movements can successfully overcome by political dialogues and accommodations rather 
than by military actions. Kohli further suggests that in defeating an insurgency in a 
multicultural democracy, such as India, a country requires “well-established central 
authority and firm but compromising leaders.”15 He also proposes that all self-
determination movements generally follow an inverse U-curve.16 In a democratic setup, 
an inverse U-curve represents a beginning of a movement that is almost non-existence, 
and then slowly grows as the group identity base energizes, and continues its struggle for 
a long period, until it finally withers or dies down. When a group realizes that its identity 
is not recognized or represented, then people have a reason a reason to mobilize and to 
confront state authority for justice. If the state refuses to address the group’s grievances, 
the group starts opposing the state violently or non-violently for power negotiation, 
which can last for a long period.17 Eventually, most movements decline because their 
                                                 
12 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 153.  
13 Ibid., 154. 
14 Ibid., 153.  
15 Atul Kohli, “Can Democracy Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? The Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India,” in Community Conflicts and the State in India, ed. Amrita Basu and 
Atul Kohli (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Kohli, “Can Democracy Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism?”  
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ideology fade, their leaders are suppressed or changed; others co-opt state authority for 
genuine power-sharing and acceptable agreement.18  
India is the largest democracy in the world and has dealt with several ethnic and 
religious insurgencies in the last six decades. India has successfully eradicated or 
marginalized three insurgencies. India was successful against the insurgencies as it 
accommodated the Tamils during the 1950s and 1960s, used force and provided a 
political voice to the Sikhs in Punjab during the 1980s, and applied military actions, 
included in the political process, and provided economic incentives against the Muslims 
in Kashmir during the 1990s.19 In Tamil Nadu, the Tamil separatist movement, based on 
linguistic identity, died down once national leaders made concessions within firm limits. 
As the central government allowed the formation of states along linguistic lines, but 
within the boundaries of a nation-state, the local political parties obtained increased 
power, realpolitik concerns took over, and as a result, mobilizing ideology lost its 
steam.20 The Sikh uprising in the state of Punjab in the 1980s was based on religious 
identity. The Sikh nationalist movement died because the population tired of the struggle, 
and the state brutally suppressed the militants. In addition, in the early 1990s, the new 
central government led by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao aided a political voice to 
separatists.21 Last, since 1989, Islamic militancy has been on rise in the valley of 
Kashmir and throughout the state of Jammu and Kashmir.22 The Indian government used 
a multi-pronged strategy to contain the Muslim militancy in Kashmir. In one approach, 
the government cracked down very hard on Islamic militants, allowed the election to 
strengthen the hands of movement leaders who were seeking political solutions, and 
“provided substantial financial subsidy to facilitate the ‘economic development.’”23 
Hence, the Indian government brought the Islamic militancy under control in late 1990s.  
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 7.  
20 Ibid., 20.  
21 Ibid., 25.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Kohli, “Can Democracy Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism?” 25–26.  
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John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy, and Michael A. Bottiglieri argue that 
attacking insurgents directly with police action will not defeat an insurgency. Military 
solutions or police approaches provide temporary relief but eventually create more 
insurgents, resulting in an expanded insurgency. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy suggest that 
the real solution should include the right combination of social, political, and military 
options.24 They suggest that a successful counterinsurgency operation must be 
“politically led, internationally comprised, multisectoral, multifunctional in their span of 
capabilities and actors, and genuinely united.”25 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy indirectly 
suggest that winning the peoples’ hearts and minds is as important as using the right 
amount of military force.26 
However, Bottiglieri suggests that because each insurgency is unique, it requires a 
unique approach. According to Bottiglieri, first, the state needs to identify the base and 
organization of an insurgency, and then use an inside-out approach or an outside-in 
approach to defeat it. The inside-out approach, Bottiglieri suggests, “target[s] the 
leadership of an insurgent organization first and slowly work[s] down to the local levels 
of insurgent activity. … [Without] any credible leadership, insurgency will facture and 
lose its strategic vision.”27 Eventually, an insurgency will lose steam and no longer pose 
any security threat. For an outside-in approach, Bottiglieri suggests first attacking outside 
edges of an insurgent organization, and then, slowly working toward the center. This 
strategy identifies the insurgents and separates them from the population. This approach 
will stop the expansion of the insurgency, so that the government can move 
systematically to destroy it.28  
                                                 
24 John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2008), ix. ProQuest ebrary, 11–12.  
25 Ibid., 48-49.  
26 Ibid., 12. 
27 Michael A. Bottiglieri, “How to Defeat Insurgencies: Searching for a Counter-insurgency Strategy” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 5, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9342.  
28 Bottiglieri, “How to Defeat Insurgencies,” 61. 
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David Galula compares insurgency to a civil war fought for political motives.29 
He suggests that the insurgency can be violent or non-violent. Most of the time, a non-
violent insurgency does not pose a great threat to national security, but it could become 
politically risky if not dealt with in its infancy.30 According to Galula, an insurgency has 
superiority over counterinsurgency because the “insurgent has [a] formidable asset—the 
ideological power of a cause on which to base his action,”31 and could launch an 
offensive at his own time and place. In comparison, counterinsurgency is mostly reactive 
and has the “responsibility to maintain order throughout the country.”32 Also, insurgents 
try to sway and dissociate the population from the counterinsurgency. In Galula’s view, 
successful counterinsurgency should consider building or rebuilding a political machine 
from the bottom-up.33  
According to John A. Nagl, for a successful counterinsurgency operation, the 
military needs to institutionalize the culture of learning and adopt tactics and strategies 
according to its enemy’s strategy. The author compares the British army’s successful 
campaign against the Malaya insurgency to the United States’ long, unsuccessful war in 
Vietnam.34 British and American armies began fights against their respective enemies 
using conventional war, and both armies suffered setbacks. However, Nagl argues that 
the British army learned its lesson and implemented a new strategy, which resulted in a 
successful counterinsurgency.35 In comparison, the American army failed to learn and 
continued to fight a conventional war against an opponent who fought asymmetrically, 
which resulted in defeat.36  
                                                 
29 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 2–5. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid., 96.  
34 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), xxii.  
35 Ibid.  
36 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, xxii. 
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According to Deepak Boyini, the Indian government should learn from the 
British’s successful experience of defeating the Malaya insurgency. He argues that 
successful counterinsurgency should include balance and a combination of enemy-centric 
and population centric approaches.37 Boyini concludes, “Enemy-centric measures based 
on reliable intelligence, a capable force, and a unified command followed by population-
centric aspects of winning hearts and minds, lead to success in countering 
insurgencies.”38 The government has to evaluate the enemy to counter its tactics and 
strategies, and at the same time, address the discontent in population to win hearts and 
minds.  
If any government wants to defeat an insurgency successfully, it must have 
effective counterinsurgency policies. Uprisings occur when particular groups of people 
have been marginalized or unjustly treated and do not have a political voice or power. 
Therefore, the government needs to recognize these groups early and address grievances 
in their infancy to prevent them from becoming a threat to national security. All scholars 
pointed out that a successful counterinsurgency includes a combination of military and 
political means supported by economic development. How to use military actions 
depends on the type of the insurgency and its organizational hierarchy.  
2. The Naxalite Insurgency in India  
The Naxalite movement is one of the oldest insurgencies in India and has been 
able to survive and flourish over the last five decades. The Naxalite insurgency is a 
Maoist movement that adopted guerrilla tactics and strategies from the Chinese 
revolution. This insurgency spread in many eastern and southern states of India and is 
slowly moving westward. 
According to Rajat Kujur, after independence and the fall of the Telangana 
movement, the Indian communists separated into three distinct paths.39 The first faction 
                                                 
37 Deepak Aneel Boyini, “Explaining Success and Failure: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and India” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), v.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Rajat Kujur, Naxal Movement in India: A Profile (New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies (IPCS), 2008), 2.  
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totally rejected Mao’s teachings and “drew inspiration from Stalin.”40 The second faction 
followed the Marxist revolutionary path. Both groups believed in a peaceful solution 
through a democratic parliamentary exercise. The third group followed the Maoist 
revolution and took the path of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. On March 2, 1967, 
the third group had its first violent conflict with the government “in a remote village 
called Naxalbari in West Bengal;”41 hence, the “Naxalite” movement. In May 1968, this 
group formed a new organization the “All India Coordination Committee of Communist 
Revolutionaries (AICCCR) [and it declared an] allegiance to the armed struggle and non-
participation in the elections.”42  
According to Banerjee, the Naxalite genesis arose from within the communist 
movement in India. Before independence, the movement’s roots planted in the 
northeastern part of the country. In 1964, after the India–China war, the communist party 
split into two, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPI(M)).43 However, in 1967, the United Front (UF), a coalition of 
communist parties assumed the power in West Bengal, but the UF failed to convert 
promises into reality. Discontented armed revolutionary groups took justice into their 
own hands. Rebels attacked upper class landlords and moneylenders, pushed them off 
their land, and established a parallel administration. Within a short period, their violent 
and revolutionary ways spread and were adopted by the communist elements in West 
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu, 
and Kashmir.  
Tilak D. Gupta argues that after the Naxalbari event, this armed resistance 
survived all forms of repressive and democratic efforts by the state. By 2006, the Naxalite 
insurgency had spread to dozens of states and nearly 40 percent of the country’s 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 3.  
43 Sumanta Banerjee, “Beyond Naxalbari,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 29 (July 22, 2006): 
3159.  
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geographic area, which affected 35 percent of the population.44 Gupta further explains 
that the Naxalite insurgency is unique to each state, which makes it very hard to counter 
effectively. In addition, states affected by the Naxalite insurgency have different political 
environments, languages, economies, political affiliations, and ruling governments; 
therefore, it is very difficult to coordinate policies and responses that could provide better 
results in defeating the insurgency.  
However, Kujur argues that because of the spread of the movement and its 
fragmented leadership, the Naxalite movement has not sustained a unified voice over the 
years. Thus, the Maoist movement separated into many factions, and the threat to the 
central government dwindled. Currently, four major groups represent the Naxalite 
movement: the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist Liberation (CPI(ML)), the 
People’s War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), and the Communist 
Party of India (Maoist) (CPI [Maoist]).45 According to Kujur, the CPI(ML) is keeping 
one foot on either side, participating in parliamentary democracy while taking part in an 
underground armed rebellion.46 He also suggests that the PWG dominates the Naxalite 
movement and its politics and runs a parallel government in a different party of the 
country.47 Kujur argues that the MCC has believed in armed struggle as a primary means 
of resistance from its inception, and the CPI (Maoist) is the new organization of the 
united Communist Party.48 
As of 2014, P. V. Ramana, a research fellow at Institute for Defense Studies and 
Analysis, described the status of the Naxalite insurgency in World Politics Review:  
The Maoist insurgents have a presence to [a] varying degree—intense to 
negligible—in 182 districts across 20 states. However, of the 182 districts 
where they have a presence, only 76 districts have witnessed violence. The 
states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha account for an 
                                                 
44 Tilak D. Gupta, “Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 41, no. 29 (July 22, 2006): 3173.  
45 Kujur, Naxal Movement in India: A Profile, 4.  
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overwhelming majority of the violence committed by the Maoist 
insurgents.49 
The Naxalite insurgency continues to spread throughout India but remains 
shallow in nature. Therefore, this insurgency still considered a low threat to national 
security. However, if the government does not deal with the Naxalites seriously, it can 
become a serious threat to national interest, and it would hinder economic and social 
development.  
3. Rise of Hindu Nationalist BJP to the National Stage  
In 1980, following the collapse of the Janata party, the BJP was formally 
established. The Sangh Parivar has been strongly supporting The BJP. The goal and 
promise behind the Hindu nationalist movement is to establish a Ram Rajya (Rule of 
Ram), a utopian Hindu state with the help of Sangh Parivar. In the 1998 general elections, 
the BJP rose to power at the national level and formed the government by creating the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA). However, 2014 was the first time the BJP won a 
clear majority and formed a government without support from other parties.  
In their separate writings, Christophe Jaffrelot and Dibyesh Anand highlight the 
hawkish and aggressive nature of the BJP in events, such as demolition of the Babri 
Masjid (Mosque) at Ram Janmabhumi (birth place of Ram, one of the main Hindu Gods), 
Ayodhya and the communal riots following the demolition in 1992, and the anti-Muslim 
violence in Gujarat in 2002.50 The BJP and its Sangh Parivar have used numerous cross-
country yatras (rallies) and inflammatory speeches from Uma Bharti and Sadhvi 
Rithambara to rouse Hindutva, Hindu ideology. As a result, on December 6, 1992, a 
massive gathering of angry and provoked kar seveks (Hindu volunteers) at the contested 
location of Babri Masjid/Ram Janmabhoomi led to the demolition of the Babri mosque. 
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The BBC and other media outlets provided continuous coverage of the demolition of the 
Babri mosque event that “served to intensify Muslim despair and anger,”51 which led to a 
wave of communal disturbance and rioting all over India. The BJP state government in 
Madhya Pradesh was slow to react to the violence and rioting against Muslims; instead, 
the government protected the Bajrang Dal.52 Muslims continued to broil over the Babri 
mosque incident, which frequently led to violence over the next decade.  
Anand also points out the BJP’s aggressive nature and hawkish governing policies 
during the anti-Muslim violence throughout the state of Gujarat in 2002 in retaliation of 
the event in Godhara, in which Muslims allegedly burned kar seveks, returning from Ram 
Janmabhoomi, alive in train compartments.53 During this time, Narendra Modi, the Chief 
Minister of Gujrat and his BJP government allegedly provided resources and political 
support for systematically killing Muslims and spreading fear among minorities.54 Anand 
explains that the politics of fear “dehumanizes minorities, instills a sense of anxiety 
among Hindus, and allows Hindutva to legitimize their actions”55  
According to Angana Chatterji, the Sangh Parivar treats Odisha (formerly known 
as Orissa) as a laboratory for Hindutva, and plans to turn Odisha into a Hindu state. 
Odisha’s population of 37 million suffers from poverty, low literacy, and massive 
unemployment.56 The Sangh Parivar is working meticulously to build its strength to 
convert Orissa into a Hindu state. By 2003, BJP affiliates had spread throughout the 
Odisha state by building 3,270 branches with more than 900,000 members.57  
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According to Bruce D. Graham, the BJP has gained strength and power from state 
to national levels because of its progressive economic agenda.58 From its birth, the BJP 
has been committed to five basic principles.59 Particularly, its fourth and fifth principles 
deal with the economy and social development policies.60 In addition, the BJP adopted 
the economic policies of Jana Sangh to support small industries, to expand the consumer 
industry for domestic consumption, and to sustain a strong public sector.61 The current 
BJP government has come to power because of its progressive economic agenda and 
Prime Minister Modi’s economic success in the state of Gujarat. Hence, the BJP could 
use social and economic development in the impoverished Naxalite region to counter the 
insurgency.  
The BJP could use its successful state-level tactics at the central level to bring 
change in the education systems, economy, and governance. The BJP may use its massive 
networks of volunteers from all the affiliated Hindu organizations to provide social and 
humanitarian work, which could help eradicate radical elements. At the same time, the 
BJP affiliated could increase its organization membership through aggressive recruitment 
for the Hindu nationalism cause.  
4. INC Party and Its Coalition UPA Government’s Counterinsurgency 
Policies toward the Naxalites  
The INC is the longest governing party of India, and it has used a unique 
counterinsurgency approach to deal with uprisings and insurgencies. In some cases, the 
INC has been successful in defeating or marginalizing the insurgencies, but it was not 
able to eradicate the Naxalite insurgency. However, the INC had been able to prevent the 
insurgency from becoming a threat to national security until 2006. Nevertheless, under 
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the INC party’s rule, the Naxalite insurgency has gained momentum from a simple leftist 
movement to a full-fledged insurgency.  
Sameer Lalwani and Dipak K. Gupta argue that the Indian government under the 
leadership of the INC had been very successful even though its approach was unique 
compared to counterinsurgency approaches around the world. According to Sameer 
Lalwani, “The Indian central and state governments’ COIN responses have been heavily 
kinetic, disregarding local public perceptions.”62 India has remained true to its historical 
counterinsurgency strategy with the Naxalite insurgency. In the beginning, the central 
government mainly used the local police force with the help of local state governments to 
contain the insurgency. The Indian central government imposed the “President’s Rule” in 
the eastern state of West Bengal in March 1970 and suspended all the democratic rights. 
Under the President’s Rule, a joint campaign was launched in April the same year by the 
Indian Military (Eastern Frontier Rifles) and the Central Reserve Police with the 
coordinated efforts of the local police to crush the Naxalite movement.63 This initiative 
almost eradicated the insurgency, but it flared again in the 1990s.  
Shamuel Tharu also agrees with Lalwani and Gupta about the Indian central 
government’s flexible approach. However, he argues that the INC government frequently 
used emergency rule or president’s rule and introduced numerous repressive legislations 
over the years to control the insurgency. The Indian constitution allows the President to 
declare states of emergency by dissolving a state government when it fails to maintain 
law and order.64 President’s rule normally lasts from six months to one year.65 Politically 
motivated central governments have used the President’s rule frequently. Between 1947 
and 1996, prime ministers from all the ruling parties used the President’s rule 91 times. 
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Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used this rule the most, 41 times.66 The President’s rule 
used 24 times in Naxalite-affected areas.67 In addition, the Indian government has 
frequently passed legislation to give more authority and freedom to its security forces so 
they can repress any uprisings.68 Tharu points out that the central government passed the 
legislation, the “Prevention of Violent Activities Act of 1970, which was designed to 
crush the Maoist revolution in the state of West Bengal.”69 Hence, the central 
government has often used force to contain uprisings under the legal authority’s 
umbrella.  
According to Raman Dixit, under the INC’s leadership, the Indian government 
has also used soft power to influence the populations to deter them from supporting 
radicals.70 The Indian central government has collaborated with state governments to 
develop affected rural areas.71 In addition, the central government tries to use different 
programs to provide good governance in this area.72 Most of the Naxalite-affected areas 
in the eastern region also happen to be rich in natural resources including coal and iron 
ores. The government has invited big corporations to invest in mines and projects in this 
area to provide employment. However, the government did not implement most of the 
efforts and end up creating more problems than solutions due to corrupt practices.  
5. Naxalite-affected States and Their Approach toward the Insurgency  
The focus of this thesis is on the five states most affected by the Naxalite 
insurgency: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal. Each 
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state has tried to use somewhat different types of strategies to deal with the insurgencies, 
ranging from political accommodations, to agrarian reforms, to brutal police actions.  
Ross Mallick suggests that because of having a communist government, the state 
of West Bengal has had the biggest advantage in utilizing its provincial power to defuse 
the Maoist movement.73 However, the state failed to bring insurgents into the mainstream 
polity. In 1967, communist parties first came to power as the UF coalition of the 
communist parties, the CPI(M) was the largest party and did not have Maoist support. 
After the Naxalbari incident, the UF teamed up with the central government to use 
repressive police action that almost wiped out the Maoists. Therefore, in 1977, when the 
CPI(M)returned to power after the emergency rule was lifted, it won the absolute 
majority in absence of a radical left and remained in power until 2011.74 Over the three-
plus decades of CPI(M)rule, it has attempted agrarian reforms by introducing programs, 
such as land redistribution, sharecropping, and rural credits and inputs.75 With help from 
the Indian central government, the state government has implemented education, 
employment, as well as health and refugee rehabilitation programs to alleviate poverty. 
The West Bengal government has also applied the Panchayat Raj system to give voice 
and power to villages for the purpose of rural development implementation.76 State 
government efforts have been effective in reducing the attraction to Maoist radical 
movements.  
Lalwani concludes that, currently, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are the hardest hit 
states, accounting for more than 50 percent of Naxalite activities.77 Both states are 
working very closely with the central government to boost their security forces. From 
2006 to 2010, these states invested heavily in their police forces. In addition, about 40 
battalions of central paramilitary forces are stationed in both states.78 These security 
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forces and other state-sponsored militia have been launching multiple operations, killing 
and capturing insurgents. At the same time, they were creating collateral damage and 
spreading dissent in civilian populations. These repressive tactics have created hatred 
toward the state and provided recruiting tools for insurgents.  
Lalwani claims that Andhra Pradesh has focused more on police action, and it 
created a special commando unit call Greyhound in 1987 to “conduct small unit counter 
guerrilla offensives against Naxalite insurgents.”79 Over the next two decades, Andhra 
Pradesh built the 2,000-strong Greyhound force by providing them better pay, state of the 
art equipment, weapons, and technology. This force receives proper training in jungle 
warfare and supported by the entire police force.80 From 2005 to 2008, Lalwani argues 
that as a result, the Maoist insurgents significantly decrease from rom 1,200 to 500, and 
Naxalite attacks dropped from 600 to 100 in 2010.81  
India’s new BJP government has many policy options for using 
counterinsurgency to defeat the Naxalite insurgency. The BJP could either continue the 
policies of previous governments, or create new policies according to its Hindu 
nationalist ideology, or implement social and economic development plans, or use of 
security forces. According to the counterinsurgency literature review, the BJP can use a 
combination of military and political solutions with the support of economic development 
to make its policies successful.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis hypothesizes that the BJP’s counterinsurgency policies will likely 
differ very little from those of the previous governments led by the INC party, but the 
character may reflect BJP’s Hindu nationalist ideology. According to Matthew Blake 
Fehrs, the BJP is famous for its hawkish approach; therefore, it may diverge from the 
previous efforts.82 The new BJP administration may take five possible approaches. First, 
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as a more aggressive institution, the BJP may intensify the use of force by expanding the 
participation of police, military, and paramilitary security forces to put more pressure on 
the insurgents. Second, as the BJP has done in Odisha, it may try to change education 
systematically to reflect Hindu nationalist ideology. Third, as seen in the BJP’s tactics 
and strategies in the Hindu belt states, the party may utilize its huge ocean of volunteers, 
including those from its affiliate organizations, to provide humanitarian services in 
expectation of increasing the Sangh Parivar membership and reducing the recruiting pool 
for insurgents. Fourth, the BJP’s principals are engrained in the Hindu religion while the 
Maoist movement is anti-religious; therefore, the BJP may try to use Hinduism as a 
weapon to root out insurgents. Lastly, according to Graham, the BJP may try to present 
itself “as a progressive party with liberal and humanitarian concerns, [and] … intervene 
in economy and social affairs in order to bring about a greater measure of equality.”83  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis topic was researched by analyzing the Indian government’s policies 
undertaken by previous administrations, and then, comparing those policies with the 
current BJP’s approach in dealing with the Naxalite insurgency. The INC party ruled for 
a majority of the 60-plus years after independence. During the 1980s, the INC started to 
lose its clear majority, but it was still a major party and was able to rule by allying with 
other small parties. The BJP government’s approach toward the Naxalites compared with 
the INC. Categories such as divergence from previous policies, Hindu nationalist 
influence, and politics of religion used to analyze the BJP’s counterinsurgency policies 
toward the Naxalites.  
In addition, a micro-level perspective of the five states affected by the Naxalite 
insurgency is used. Since states have different political environments, languages, 
economies, and ruling governments, each state is a unique case. Dependent and 
independent variables affecting them including state-center relations are also compared.  
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For this research, all available primary and secondary scholarly sources consulted, 
including but not limited to books, articles, theses, news articles, and government 
sources.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I covers the introduction of the Naxalite insurgency, the INC, and the 
BJP. Chapter II analyzes the Naxalite movement, its history, and current status. Chapter 
III provides a brief history of INC and its policies toward the Naxalites from 
independence to the year 2014, and the approach of the Indian state government affected 
by the Naxalites. Chapter IV provides information on the rise of Hindu nationalism, the 
BJP’s history and rise to power in the central government, as well as the BJP’s polices 
toward Naxalites, and compares the policies of the BJP and the INC. Finally, Chapter V 
presents the conclusion.  
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II. HISTORY OF THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY: THE 
FOUNDING YEARS TO 2004 
It is important to understand the background of the Naxalite insurgency, a Maoist 
movement that appears to have become a perennial part of the Indian political landscape. 
It is important to understand the foundations of this insurgency and what keeps it going 
before looking at the counterinsurgency policies of the Indian governments. An important 
question needs to keep in mind: why this movement resorts in armed struggle, as their 
main tool and tactic, instead of looking for a political solution. This chapter reviews the 
last 50 years, and provides the origins of the insurgency, political development, 
successes, and failures, reasons for spreading throughout India, and problems of rich 
natural resources.  
Since its independence, India has dealt with few uprisings and insurgencies; some 
of those efforts were successful and few were not. The Indian government successfully 
contained Sikh extremism in Punjab in the 1980s, the Tamil uprising for Telangana in the 
1950s, and was able to contain an Islamist insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir in the 
1990s, although recent violence in Kashmir suggests a reemergence. However, India has 
not been able to suppress one of its oldest, simmering insurgencies completely, the 
Naxalites. The Naxalite insurgency is a Maoist movement that claims to be fighting for 
Dalits and tribal people, for social justice, and economic equality. This five-decade-long 
insurgency initiated an armed struggle and violence in the 1960s, which provided a very 
promising start to the Naxalite movement. However, it failed to sustain momentum and 
fizzled after a government crackdown in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the insurgency 
remerged, and started to spread within many tribal and poor areas of eastern and southern 
India. In the new millennium, the threat of the Naxalite insurgency has increased, which 
has caused the central government to give serious attention to the Naxalite insurgency 
and treat it as a threat to Indian national security. Figure 1 shows the Naxalite and other 




The Indian regions affected by the insurgency. 
Figure 1.  Map of India Shows All Active Insurgency.84 
A. START OF THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT (1960s)  
The Naxalite insurgency gets its name from the tiny remote village called 
Naxalbari located in the foothills of the Himalayas in the Terai region. In the early 20th 
century, a small group of intellectuals in India influenced by the Marxist ideology and the 
rise of the Soviet Union introduced the communist movement in India. However, the 
movement was defeated at the national level by a stronger democratic movement led by 
the INC. The Indian state of West Bengal was one of the first of a few states to 
experience the rapid spread of the communist ideology, which began to influence its 
society and politics. However, radicals in the Indian communist movement were 
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relatively unknown and mostly peaceful until the violent incident occurred in the Terai 
region. On March 2, 1967, in a village of Naxalbari, the court granted legal property 
rights to a tribal youth named Bimal Kissan. When he went to plough his land, the 
landlord and his hired armed personnel attacked him.85 By April 1967, the Maoist 
ideology and radical communist leaders’ inflammatory speeches rallied a massive base of 
followers; approximately “20,000 peasants were enrolled as whole-time activists. 
Peasant’ committees were formed in every village and they were transformed into armed 
guards,”86 in West Bengal. They soon occupied hundreds of acres land, burned nearly all 
available records of debt and dues, passed death sentences on presumed oppressive 
landlords, and looted landlords and their weapons.87  
Initially, the central and state governments wanted to respond with a softer 
approach, but they ended up conducting a major crackdown after the Naxalbari incident. 
When police received the reports from landlords that armed groups are looting grains and 
guns from their homes, they came to investigate.88 In a show of force, a large number of 
police arrived in the village; however, gathered tribal peasants (armed with bow and 
arrows) attacked the leading police inspector and killed him.89 The next day, in 
retaliation, police open fired upon a crowd of villagers, killing nine, including six women 
and two children.90 In a very short amount of time, information about this incident 
reached to a majority of members of the communist movement and received a respectable 
amount of support from the state units of the communist parties in Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West 
Bengal.91 The Naxalbari incident sparked the debate and division amongst the violent 
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and non-violent communist followers. As a result, the rift in the Indian communist 
movement became even wider.  
According to Atul Kohli’s theoretical framework for understanding popular 
uprisings, when a group realizes that it is treated unfairly, its identity is in jeopardy, or it 
feels under-represented, it can mobilize and confront state authority for justice. If the 
state refuses to address the group’s grievances, the group opposes the state violently or 
non-violently to negotiate for power, which can last for an extended period.92 Soon after 
the Soviet revolution in Russia in 1917, peasants from the tribal and poor area of West 
Bengal and other eastern and southern states, were able to organize the Indian communist 
movement, channeling the frustration and anger of these tribal people, and demand social 
and economic justice. Therefore, the seeds for peasant rebellion were planted before India 
became independent.  
According to Dipak K. Gupta, “no less than 110 violent peasant uprisings have 
been recorded between 1783 and 1900.”93 When the clothing industry expanded in 
England and other parts of Europe, it resulted in a significant increase in demand for 
indigo as a dye and as well as the prices for it. Hence, the British rulers of India forced 
peasants in the Bengal region to plant indigo, an inedible cash crop instead of traditional 
food grains.94 Gupta claims, “This inevitably brought widespread hunger in the rural 
areas and led to the first rebellion in the 1860s.”95 Also during the colonial rule, the 
British distributed land ownership to zamindars (landlords) to promote property rights as 
a part of the capitalist system so they could charge taxes and collect revenues.96 In turn, 
these zamindars leased their land to landless peasants for farming and collected half of 
their yield.97 Hence, this system started the vicious cycle of exploitation and suppression 
of peasants. Thus, the disparity between rich landlords and poor sharecroppers widened.  
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Initially in the first 20 years of independence, the radicals in the Indian 
communist movement waited steadfastly for the government’s land reforms and justice to 
take place before resorting to major violent armed conflict.98 After India received 
independence on August 15, 1947, the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
promoted a policy of socialism and promised to bring equality to all. He proclaimed that 
the new Indian “Constitution would guarantee its citizens justice, social, economic and 
political equality status; of opportunity, and before the law; freedom of thought, 
expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action, subject to law and 
public morality.”99 Nehru also passed a resolution, which states, “adequate safeguards 
shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas, and depressed and other 
backward classes.”100 However, the new India continued the colonial property rights 
systems and never implemented required land reforms fully. During the next 20 years of 
independence, democratic governments failed to provide the fairness for which the 
landless peasants were looking. According to a 1971 census, the majority of the land was 
owned by only four percent of landlords, while landless peasants accounted for 60 
percent of the population.101 The radical elements in the communist movement took 
advantage of widespread frustration, anger, and dissent amongst the tribal and landless 
peasants, recruiting them and setting forth a path of armed struggle. Eventually, in March 
1967, the event in the village of Naxalbari, described previously, marked the new but 
distinctly violent path for the Maoist movement. These radicals got the name as the 
Naxalite insurgency.  
B. THE CPI AND ITS DIVISIONS  
The Naxalite insurgency branched out from the original communist movement in 
India, which itself has a long history. The communist movement in India has provided an 
ideology, a platform, and a structure to the many directionless uprisings of landless 
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peasants. In the beginning, India had only one communist party, the CPI, but due to the 
national and international political events and turmoil, as well as internal disputes and 
differences, over the years, the communist movement divided in several fractions. 
Historically, on December 26, 1925, a few intellectuals influenced by the social 
revolution in Russia and the Marxist ideology, established the CPI to fight colonial 
repressive rule “with a view to fight for national independence and a future of 
socialism.”102 The history of the communist movement started with the communist-led 
peasant uprising in the district of Telangana (1946–51), where the peasants attacked and 
killed landlords.103 Another similar movement started in West Bengal, known as 
“tebhaga,” where peasants demanded that they only turn over one-third instead of the 
traditional 50 percent of yielded crops required by the landlords.104  
These experiences led the CPI down two distinct paths, but it remained a unified 
party. Bhalchandra Trimbak Ranadive was the first leader to take a separate path from the 
other followers of the communist movement. He rejected the Chinese revolution and 
promoted the idea of democratic and social revolution in urban areas among the working 
class, inspired by Stalin, whereas the Chinese revolution was more rural based.105 The 
second group learned from the Telangana movement, drawing inspiration from the 
Chinese revolution, and Mao Zedong’s teaching of guerrilla warfare. Ajay Ghosh and 
Shripad Amrit Dange led a third group, and they adopted the centrist view, taking the 
path of parliamentary democracy.106  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the divisions continued in the Indian communist party as 
the first group left the CPI and created a new party, the CPI(M). Two different 
ideological groups already existed, but the division became even clearer as the rift 
between the Soviet Union and China started to increase and the border dispute between 
India and China became unpleasant. In the 1962 war, India suffered a humiliating defeat 
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at the hands of the Chinese, which created a dilemma for the Indian communist followers 
of Mao. Due to this war, many followers of the CPI (for patriotic reasons) denounced 
Maoism. In addition, in 1964, the confrontations of the Soviet Union and China over the 
Siberian border were enough to split the CPI into two segments.107 The older generation 
remained part of the original CPI and followed the path of the Soviet Union. However, 
the younger generation decided to build a new party, the CPI(M).108 According to Kujur, 
“Though there were serious differences on ideological and tactical grounds, both the 
parties went ahead with their parliamentary exercises and formed the UF government in 
West Bengal.”109 In 1967, the CPI and the CPI(M) won major seats in the state 
parliamentary elections and formed the UF government in West Bengal but it only 
survived a few months. However, in 1969, CPI(M) won clear majority and formed the 
government until the state was placed under President’s rule in March 1970.110  
The failure of the UF and CPI(M) governments to deliver promised and overdue 
land reforms, in a timely manner, led to further splits within the movement and ideology. 
The UF’s coming to power in the state government had escalated the expectations of the 
poor and landless peasants. They expected faster land redistribution to overcome, 
poverty, and exploitation by the landlords. After coming to power, the UF government 
also pledged land reforms, and immediately “announced a policy of quick distribution of 
surplus land among the landless and the stopping of eviction of the sharecroppers.”111 
The new government also announced many new programs to help poor and landless 
peasants. Although the UF government made promises, it did not know how to recover 
the land from the landlords and they were hamstrung due to litigation filed by the 
landlords.112 The duel obligation of fulfilling their promises, while remaining tied to 
bringing about change through judiciary and bureaucracy, placed the UF government in a 
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difficult situation. The delay caused more frustration of the democratic process and 
fueled the anger of poor peasants, leading to the Naxabari incident. This incident 
provided two paths to pursue socialist revolution, either using violence or a peaceful 
political process, via the democratic system. In May 1968, the AICCCR was formed, 
which declared “allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the 
elections.”113 Hence, the AICCCR became face of the Naxalite insurgency known today.  
Leaders and members of the AICCCR were conflicted in their views on how to 
carry out an armed struggle, and to deal with the class enemy. The AICCCR had of two 
major groups. T. Nagi Reddy led one group from Andhra Pradesh, and Kahai Chatterjee 
led a second group from West Bengal. When the AICCCR adopted the strategy of the 
“annihilation of the class enemy,” Chatterjee led his group out and formed the CPI(M) in 
May 1969.114 In 1970, during the first congress, the CPI(ML) formally elected 59-year 
old infirm Charu Majumdar as a general secretary.115 In 1965, Mazumdar wrote eight 
documents on democratic revolution, which provided the basic framework for the 
CPI(ML) movement to achieve an Indian revolution using the Maoist path.116 According 
to Kujur, “During this period, Charu Majumdar became the undisputed Naxalite guru and 
With the help of Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal, the [Naxalite] movement spread to 
different corners of the country,”117 such as Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Odisha. On 
October 20, 1969, because of tactical and technical differences, Chatterjee and others, 
separated from the AICCCR and created a new group, initially known as Dakshin 
Desh.118 Later in 1975, the group changed its name to the MCC. According to Kujur, the 
MCC believed in “armed struggle as the main form of resistance and waging a protracted 
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people’s war as the central task of the party.”119 T. Nagi Reddy went on to form the 
Revolutionary Communist Committee (RCC) of Andhra Pradesh.120 
In 1972, after the death of Majumdar , the CPI(ML) withered away for a while 
and the movement suffered from further splits in the next decade. Without the strong 
leadership and directions of Majumdar , the CPI(ML) lacked vision, which then brought 
many individual differences to the surface. One of the founders of the CPI(ML), Kanu 
Sanyal left the movement and joined the activity of the parliamentary democratic 
revolution.121 On June 25, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of 
emergency, and she arrested thousands of politicians and journalists.122 Under this rule, 
the central and the state governments’ security forces suppressed and significantly 
marginalized the Naxalite insurgency. Therefore, Jauhar (Subrata Dutt), Nagbhusan 
Patnaik, and Vinod Mishra reorganized the CPI(ML) and renamed “CPI(ML) Liberation” 
to keep all followers interested and engaged.123 However, in 1980, further disputes led 
Kondapalli Seetharamaiah in Andhra Pradesh to create the PWG, and N. Prasad from 
Bihar to start the CPI(ML) Party Unity organization.124 The CPI(ML) Liberation did not 
want to reject completely the solution of parliamentary politics. In contrast, PWG and 
MCC completely rejected parliamentary politics. Kujur points out that in 2003, “MCC 
merged with the Revolutionary Communist Center of India (RCCI-M) to form the Maoist 
Communist Center-India (MCC-I).”125 Finally, in 2004, two major armed guerilla 
groups, PWG and MCC-I merged to create the CPI(M).126 The primary goal for the 
CPI(M)is to overthrow the parliamentary democracy though prolonged armed struggle 
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and bring the new democratic revolution.127 The CPI(M) is now the united face of the 
Naxalite insurgency.  
C. THE NAXALITES’ SUPPORT AND RECRUITING BASE 
The Maoists thrive on the displaced and dissented Adivasi people, who are their 
main source of recruitment and core of resistance; however, most Maoist leadership does 
not come from the Adivasi people.128 The Maoist leadership was mostly made up of 
people from affluent and upper-class families. These young leaders had a higher level of 
education, financial resources, and more free time on their hands to create this radical 
movement. Poor peasants would have been unable to create the sustainable movement 
while buried under daily laborer work. However, the Naxalite insurgency draws its 
majority of support from the Adivasi and Dalit inhabited areas in all affected states. The 
mainstream population and the state historically marginalized these communities. 
Banerjee describes that the Adivasi and Dalits have experienced “widespread 
displacement, forest issues, insecure tenancies and other forms of exploitation like usury, 
land alienation and imperfect market condition.”129 These phenomena started long before 
India became a free country, back in the 18th century while under British rule. Asad Ismi 
agrees with Ramachandra Guha, arguing that the practices have continued in post-
colonial India, “The Adivasis … were among the poorest people … being denied basic 
services by the Indian state with their land being stolen by New Delhi since 1947 ... This 
thievery violates the Indian Constitution itself, which protects the land rights of 
Adivasi.”130 Therefore, these conditions and issues make them prime candidates for 
radicalization and a force against the state and their exploiters. The Naxalite propaganda 
is very successful in tapping into their frustration, desperation, and misery; using it not 
only for their advantage of potential recruits, but also for safe havens. 
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About one-fourth of the Indian population falls in the Adivasi and Dalit 
categories, which mostly live in rural areas.131 As of 2007, according to Guha, out of 85 
million Adivasi tribal people, nearly half of these populations live in the areas controlled 
by the Naxalites.132 These people live in the heartland of India, in forests, hills and 
largely inaccessible areas of states spread north to south, largely concentrated in the 
eastern part of India: the states of West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra.133 These people are very 
poor, mostly relying on day-to-day labor, using products and food that the forest has to 
offer. In the Naxalite affected area, 32 percent of people live below the poverty line, on 
less than $1 a day.134 However, their culture is full of rich traditions, music, and dances; 
women receive equal treatment, and their rituals and religion center around village gods 
and spirits.135 Loss of their livelihood, forest, and extreme poverty makes them an easy 
target for recruitment and mobilization by the Maoists.  
Literacy rates among the Adivasi are the lowest in India; however, they have 
improved over last five decades. This rate has had an impact on mobilization, as educated 
people are more politically active. According to a census taken in 1961, literacy rates 
among tribal people had been only 8.53 percent compared to 28.3 percent for total 
populations, but it steadily increased from 29.60 percent in 1991 to 58.96 percent in 
2011, compared to 72.99 percent for the total population (see Table 1).136 Most tribal 
people have primary educations with only 12–13 percent with a certificate or high school 
degree. These factors make tribal people more vulnerable to well-organized communist 
radicals.  
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Table 1.   Comparative Literacy Rates of Schedule Tribes and Total Populations 
(in Percent).137 
Category/Census Year 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 
Total Population 28.3 34.45 43.57 52.21 64.84 72.99 
Schedule Tribes 8.53 11.30 16.35 29.60 47.10 58.96 
Gap  19.77 18.15 19.88 22.61 18.28 14.03 
 
From the beginning of the Indian independence, the local and central governments 
had been promising equality and prosperity to the poor and aboriginal people of the 
country, but the government had yet to deliver on its promises. During colonial rule, the 
British recognized the problem in Indian society, so they began efforts to develop and 
protect the Adivasi and Dalit and other minorities, to prevent these communities from 
rebelling. When India became independent, the efforts to improve the lives of the Dalits 
and tribal people continued. In 1947, the Indian constitution granted special status to the 
Adivasi and Dalits, classifying them as “scheduled tribes” and a “scheduled cast” making 
them eligible for special development programs and equal opportunities.138 However, by 
the 1960s, government reports confirmed a total “failure of the state in providing a life of 
dignity and honor to tribal citizens.”139 The government failure was due to widespread 
corruption within the system, and unsympathetic behavior toward the government’s 
official representatives to poor and neglected tribal and Dalit people. Guha argues that 
wide disparity occurred between the government official in-charge of development 
schemes and their knowledge of the tribal area and its requirements; hence, they failed to 
identify the real needs and problems of the people.140 In addition, government 
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recommendations were never implemented, which failed to reduce the widespread 
support for radical communist elements.  
D. CREATING A CLASS IDENTITY  
India is one of the most socially complex countries in the world because of its 
unique cultures and identities. India is a huge country, the home for the world’s second 
largest population. India has huge diversity including many regions, religions, and 
languages in addition to its intricate caste and class systems. For example, India has two 
official national languages, Hindi and English; however, it has 22 recognized languages, 
31 languages received the status of official languages for the Indian states, and 880 
languages and over 1,000 dialects spoken today.141 In addition, India has 3,000-year-old 
caste system, which has four main categories, and “the main castes were further divided 
into about 3,000 castes and 25,000 sub-castes, each based on their specific 
occupation.”142 The Naxalite affected areas made up of more than 500 communities, 
which come under the label “schedule tribes,” and each shares in its unique culture, 
language, and region.143 Every Indian is born with multiple identities, and each identity 
has a different importance and meaning for an Indian’s existence. For example, two 
Indian individuals can have two distinct identity groups, one can be Hindu by religion, an 
upper caste, Hindi-speaking, rich Brahman, and the other can be Sikh by religion, lower 
cast, Punjabi-speaking, poor Dalit. Hence, each person can at least recognize or belong to 
four different identities. Therefore, many scholars agreed that the British were able to 
rule India for more than 200 years by exploiting these identities. Even after 
independence, the Indian political leaders from different political parties and ideologies 
are successful in manipulating these identities to rally the masses behind their party and 
cause, to come into and stay in power. Thus, how was the Naxalite insurgency able to 
create an identity in which to unify and rally people behind its cause?  
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The Naxalite insurgency claimed to fight for social and economic equality; hence, 
the class-based movement. The Maoists are mostly successful in uniting the tribal and 
Dalit people, to fight for economic and social injustice; hence, undermining their other 
identities, such as religion, caste, and linguistic. Dalits, untouchables, and tribal people, 
are treated equally (without any religious or caste prejudice and hierarchy) when they 
join the ranks of the Maoists. The French revolution was based on poverty and social 
injustice.144 Thereby, the Maoists realized that they must unite their base of followers 
under one common identity and cause to bring revolution. For years, the poor landless 
tribal and Dalit peasants were unable to produce a mass movement until the radical 
elements from the communist movement provided a direction and leadership. The 
younger generation of Indian communists started the radical Maoist movement. Most of 
these radical leaders and activist were neither Dalit nor tribal but mostly urban educated 
middle and upper class youth.145 These young radical leaders lived and worked with poor 
and suppressed groups to win their trust and confidence, eventually uniting them under 
one cause. According to Gupta, “The motivations are shaped by an actor’s collective 
identity.”146 Therefore, there was a lack of mass movements, despite prevalent frustration 
and disparities. Gupta further explains: 
Collective action takes place when political entrepreneurs give shape to a 
collective identity. The collective identity, which defines “us” and “them,” 
is socially determined, and is constructed by political leaders. When a 
large number of people accept the leaders’ version of what constitutes a 
community and who the enemies are, a collective action is born.  
The basis of a collective identity can be “ascriptive” or “adoptive.” Thus, 
collective identities based on ethnicity, religion, language, or national 
origin can be seen as ascriptive or based on birth characteristics. On the 
other hand, when people form groups on the basis of environmental causes 
or, on the basis of Marxist idea of economic class, we may call these 
groupings adoptive.147 
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Years of unprecedented suppression and exploitation of landless Indian peasants 
had created frustration and anger, which made them ready for violent revolution.148 
Charu Majumdar  and his comrade Sanyal worked and lived with landless peasants for 
years, so when they recognized that the conditions for uprising were ripe, they were able 
to ignite “class hatred” by the “killings of landlords and the rapacious moneylenders.”149 
Hence, the radical communist leaders were successful in establishing an economic class 
identity for poor and landless peasants.  
E. NEW DIMENSION FOR THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY  
The initial Maoist movement was due to the perceived social, political, and 
economic alleged injustice and inequality. The Maoists started to use violence against 
village’s hardliner landlords and rapacious moneylenders. Later, the government became 
its new enemy, because, instead of trying to improve their lives, the state started to 
implement several new economic policies that resulted in worsening their lives. Since 
1991, India adopted a new economic policy, neoliberalism. Under this policy, India 
liberalized its economy, to bring more foreign direct investment, economic growth, and 
development. When the Indian economy started to take off, it needed more energy 
sources and natural mineral resources to continue to fuel it. Consequently, India’s 
mineral-rich lands, located within the forests and rugged areas of the eastern region, 
affected the Naxalites, where 84 million tribal people lived and survived on forestland. 
The Indian state, ignoring the problems of social and economic injustice faced by these 
people, started to lease these mineral-rich lands to big corporations. This situation created 
more trouble for the Adivasis, which fueled more frustration and anger amongst them. 
Hence, these natural resource rich areas become a curse for the indigenous people.  
Strong economic growth in India increased the demand for energy and mineral 
resources provided a new lifeline for the Naxalite insurgency. However, since 1991, the 
Indian center and local states started to lease forestland to national and international 
companies including Tata, Jindal, Mittal and other national and international 
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corporations.150 In addition, the Indian state security forces provided security for these 
industrial corporations to protect the area for mining and industry. Using coercion, 
money-power and armed government and private security forces, industrial powerhouses 
grabbed the forestland, which affected the livelihood of the Adivasis and displaced them. 
This event provided a new cause for landless tribal people to join the Maoists and fight 
against the state with even more tenacity.  
Indian elites and big corporations experienced economic advantage from 
industrial projects and mining within forest areas, while leading to a massive 
displacement of its natives while having devastating effects on the environment. 
According to Ismi, “Jharkhand, along with four other states in which the insurgency is 
strongest, accounts for 85% of India’s coal deposits. Jharkhand also contains the world’s 
biggest iron ore deposit.”151 As a rising economic global power, India needs more natural 
resources for its energy and industrial needs. Therefore, center and state governments are 
rapidly leasing and distributing mining rights to national and international industrial 
corporations. Ismi further argues, “The corrupt Jharkhand government has signed 42 
Memorandums of Understanding with various large iron and steel companies.”152 These 
companies and the state are using armed paramilitary and militia forces to force out tribal 
people from their land, and are denying them access to their livelihood. These 
government policies, instead of bringing progress and alleviating economic problems, 
have further impoverished and ostracized large groups of poor tribal people. Hence, tribal 
people resorted to violence and joined the Naxalite insurgency.  
Since the 1990s, new developments have provided a new narrative to strengthen 
the position of the Naxalites, their apparent recruiting of the people, and the opportunity 
to extort money. Due to industrial development within the Naxalite’s stronghold areas, 
displaced and disgruntle Adivasis have provided a great recruiting opportunity and safe 
havens for the Naxalite’s insurgency. At the same time, the Naxalites learned to take 
advantage of this development and use it in their favor. According to Xavier Dias, “the 
                                                 




insurgents also attack Adivasi villages, extort money from mining companies, and protect 
the ones that are grabbing land from Adivasi.”153 The Naxalites are using the Maoist 
ideology to create guerrilla groups, while resorting to extortion for money and power. In 
the process, they are also terrorizing and killing poor peasants and those who are against 
their tactics and demands.154 In other words, lines between the Maoist ideology and 
criminalities have become blurry. The Naxalite extremist groups, such as the MCC, are 
selling protection to corporations, protection against their investment and economic 
activities, and protection to avoid damage and danger from violent groups.155 As Alpa 
Shah suggests, “Terrorism, banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry and state-making all belong 
on the same continuum, selling protection. In Jharkhand, the MCC—like state 
representatives—is selling protection to access the informal economy of the state, but 
also protection from the possibilities of its own activities.”156 Despite the Naxalite’s 
criminal type of activities, people still support these organizations because of their 
coercive power and control, out of fear, and because they benefit from their activities.157 
These activities also occur due to the lack of government police and servicers in the 
Naxalite affected areas.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this chapter provides a detailed background of the Naxalite 
insurgency, its origin, political ideology and support, its recruitment base, and economic 
dynamics. The roots for the peasant uprising planted long before Indian independence, 
but they became more organize when the radical leaders of the communist movement 
provided a proper direction, an inspiration, organization, and collective identity. 
However, this movement was very peaceful during the first 20 years of independence, but 
they then resort to violence and armed struggle when the government failed to provide 
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political and social justice and economic equality. Since 1991, the Naxalite insurgency 
resurrected to new life, due to the Indian states’ neoliberal policies, which further 
affected the livelihood of tribal peoples. Now, the government is facing a new, 
widespread, more violent insurgency, which is using the economic development as 
moneymaking business, leaning toward criminal activities and undermining their main 
ideology. India’s economic development depends on the vast amount of natural mineral 
resources found within the Naxalite manifested area. The next chapter explores the 
history of the Indian state and affected regional government policies to mitigate the 
Naxalite insurgency.  
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III. STATE RESPONSE TO NAXALITE 
INSURGENCY (1967–2014) 
India is a huge country with a very diverse population. It has frequently benefited 
from its diversity, and at the same time, faced many problems. In the post-colonial 
period, several distinct minority groups have fought for autonomy or to form a discrete 
state from the Indian state. The fight for freedom led to several uprisings and 
insurgencies; they caused by either religious, linguistic, or ethnic identities, or even 
economic and social equality and justice. Due to such conflicts, the Indian government 
has gained significant experience in dealing with insurgencies and uprisings. The major 
insurgencies India has tackled include the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, the insurgency in 
Kashmir, the Telangana movement in Tamil Nadu, the Bodo and United Liberation Front 
of Assam (ULFA) insurgency, as well as the separatist insurgencies within Assam and 
the Naxalite insurgency of the eastern and southern parts of India. Of all these 
insurgencies, the Naxalite insurgency has been one of the strongest and the longest; 
spread over more than 40 percent of India and in existence since 1967.158 It is therefore 
paramount to learn of the past Indian governments’ policies and responses to the Naxalite 
insurgency to compare it with the current governmental approaches to understand its 
future. This chapter focuses on the Indian central government’s approach toward the 
Naxalite insurgency during the rule of the INC political party and its alliances between 
1947 and 2014. Also, this chapter answers questions of the governmental policies of the 
five states affected by the Naxalite insurgency during the same time period. These states 
include Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal.  
As the world’s largest democracy, the Indian government has to consider many 
things before responding to any insurgency. India has its limitations because it is a 
democratic country. In a legitimate democratic system, ruling political parties must go 
through an election process to receive the people’s mandate. Therefore, like every 
legitimate government, it has to deal with opinions and concerns raised by both domestic 
and international communities. The Naxalite insurgency knows this dilemma and uses it 
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to its advantage. Therefore, it has outlasted many states and the central government over 
its five decades old history. During this period, New Delhi has seen several different 
political parties ruling India, including the INC centrist party, the BJP rightwing Hindu 
party, and their coalitions with communist and socialist parties. Similar patterns can be 
observed at the state level governments as well.  
A. HISTORY OF THE INC PARTY AND ITS APPROACH TO 
INSURGENCY  
The INC party is one of the oldest parties in India, and more importantly, India 
was able to establish a strong democratic foundation in the country. According to 
Christopher Candland, “The Indian National Congress party was founded in 1885 to 
petition the British government in India, for administrative and political reform. Under 
British rule, the Congress gained experience in contesting elections and in governing at 
provincial and municipal levels.”159 In the first few decades of existence, the primary 
agenda of the INC was to gain greater political autonomy within the British Empire and 
not to fight for independence.160 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi arrived in the 1920s, 
and reorganized the party to attract millions from all walks of life. On August 15, 1947, 
India received its independence from the British, and the INC became the first ruling 
party, overwhelmingly winning the first general election in 1952.161 In 1953, Jawaharlal 
Nehru became the first prime minister of India and led a shaky independent India into a 
stable and united India within the next decade.162 For the next five decades, the INC 
dominated the Indian political arena; however, its political stake declined over the years, 
eventually losing the central government to the BJP and many states’ governments to 
other local and national parties in 2014. 
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During the INCs lengthy control of the center from 1947 until 1996, it 
encountered several insurgencies that included (but not limited to) political, identity, and 
economic reasons. According to Shahid R. Siddiqi, in India, “In all, an estimated 30 
armed insurgency movements are sweeping across the country, reflecting an acute sense 
of alienation on the part of the people involved.”163 In the 1950s, in the state of 
Hyderabad and later Andhra Pradesh, the Telangana movement, based on linguistic 
divisions, lasted until they received a separate state of Telangana in 2013.164 The 
Kashmir region is the home of an ongoing ethnic insurgency based on political rights. 
The Sikh insurgency in Punjab, the Khalistan movement of the 1980s, was also for 
religious and political rights. India’s northeastern region has seven states, also known as 
the Seven Sisters, and home of several armed insurgencies. As Siddiqui explains:  
The Seven Sisters are significantly different, ethnically and linguistically, 
from the rest of the country. These states are rocked by a large number of 
armed and violent rebellions, some seeking separate states, some fighting 
for autonomy and others demanding complete independence, keeping the 
entire region in a state of turmoil. These states include Assam, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.165 
Finally, the five decades old Maoist movement, also known as the Naxalite 
insurgency, has taken arms against the state to demand social and economic justice. The 
Indian central government led by the Congress party (INC) used a unique hands-on 
approach to deal with each insurgency, having mixed results.  
1. Telangana Movement and Linguistic Issues 
After independence, India faced its first major uprising based on linguistic 
identity, the Telangana movement. In 1950, at the time when the constitution 
inaugurated, India was divided into four kinds of states.166 According to Partha 
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Chatterjee, “The part A states were former provinces of British India, … The Part B 
states were the products of the integration of the princely states; … The Part C states 
were either the former Chief Commissioner’s provinces or smaller units formed by the 
integration of the princely states, … a Part D state—the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands.”167 This particular way of forming states did not follow any logical principles of 
organization. The INC government realized that to hold the country together, it had to 
deal with the issue of different identities. In this huge diverse nation, one of the biggest 
identity issues was languages. Hence, after independence, the new government decided to 
form states into linguistic provinces.168  
The INC government responded to massive popular agitations and further created 
states on the bases of linguistic identity. The Telangana movement desired state 
autonomy based on language; hence, in December 1952, Nehru announced the state of 
Andhra Pradesh based on the Telugu speaking majority district of Madras (currently 
Chennai).169 Consequently, Sikh, Marathi, Gujarati, Kannada, Tamil, and other major 
languages (with speaking populations) also started to demand the further division of 
states based on languages. In 1954, as political pressure mounted, and as mass agitations 
built up to address this matter, the government of India (led by the INC) established the 
State Reorganization Commission (SRC).170 The SRC led the formation of several new 
states based on languages. In the next few years, the SRC had completely erased the 
legacy of British India and the princely states. A few of the new states are Gujarat for the 
Gujarati language speaking population and Maharashtra for the Marathi language 
speaking population instead of Bombay, and the same as Kerala for the Malayalam 
language speaking populations, and Karnataka for the Kannada speaking population. 
Ramachandra Guha argues, “Linguistic reorganization seems rather to have consolidated 
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the unity of India. … the creation of linguistic states has acted as a largely constructive 
channel for provincial pride. … as well as contentedly Indian.”171  
2. Sikh Insurgency  
For the Islamist insurgency in Kashmir and the Sikh separatist insurgency in 
Punjab, the Indian central government used a different approach. These insurgencies 
started based on religious identity and political rights (seeking autonomy in both). In 
1947, at the time of partition, the Hindu dominated central government in New Delhi 
promised the Sikh community autonomy for their state of Punjab and renaming it 
Khalistan.172 However, the central government accomplished neither, which caused the 
Sikh community to feel betrayed. In the 1980s, the Sikh separatist movement turned into 
a violent uprising; however, the central government of Indira Gandhi decided to crush the 
insurgency by force.173 In June 1984, she sent Indian security forces to storm the Golden 
Temple in Amritsar (the holiest shrine of Sikhism) to root out armed militants in an 
operation known as “Operation Blue Star.”174 During this event, more than 3,000 people 
died, including militants and innocent pilgrims.175  
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was able to subdue the insurgency although she 
angered the entire Sikh community. As a result, five months into Operation Blue Star, her 
own Sikh bodyguards assassinated Prime Minister Gandhi.176 In retaliation, the Hindu 
community all around the nation killed numerous Sikhs. Edward A. Gargan estimated 
more than 20,000 casualties resulted during the Sikh insurgency over the years.177 
Eventually, the Sikh nationalist movement died because of a combination of population 
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fatigue, political, and the brutal state suppression of the militants. The new central 
government led by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao provided a political 
accommodation to separatists in the early 1990s.178 Thus, the Sikh insurgency ended due 
to the Indian central government’s military and political actions. The latter approach of 
political accommodation was more effective than military action.  
3. Kashmir Insurgency  
In the case of the Islamist insurgency of the Kashmir region, the Indian 
government has been using all kinds of approaches to contain it, but the insurgency has 
been on a roller coaster ride for several decades. The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is as 
old as the independence of India and Pakistan from the British, the time of partition of a 
united India. Both countries have held numerous diplomatic talks and have fought three 
wars over this region, unable to come to any solid peace agreement acceptable to both 
sides. However, in 1990s, the Indian government was able to contain the insurgency. 
India used a mixed soft and hard approach to control this insurgency. M2 Presswire,179 
the world’s third largest electronic press release distribution service, has described in 
detail the Indian government’s approach to counterinsurgency. The Union and the state 
governments executed a policy towards Jammu and Kashmir that included the following 
four principles:  
[1] Deepening of the democratic process, 
[2] Isolation of the militants and foreign mercenaries from the people 
[3] Pro-active role within Jammu & Kashmir to neutralize the hostile 
designs of militants and foreign mercenaries.  
[4] Galvanizing the Development Programs. 
Due to operationalization of a carefully crafted action plan to contain, and 
eventually [in the 1990s] wipe out militancy in Jammu & Kashmir—the 
ground situation has improved significantly. Trade and economic activities 
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have shown sure-signs of revival, with greater number of tourists visiting 
the State [through the 1990s and early 2000s].180 
During this entire time, the Indian government approach resulted in containing the 
insurgency but was unable to destroy it. The aforementioned approach does not include 
the frequent military crackdowns by the Indian government. India has responded with a 
very strong hand to any terrorist activities, not only targeting armed militants, but 
frequently the civilian communities perceived to be disloyal and supporting the rebels.181 
As a result, often-violent militant activities and popular uprisings occur in the Kashmir 
Valley. As seen in 2016, the Kashmiri militancy has taken another violent turn, and the 
Indian state has responded with a suppressing military force. India and Pakistan are again 
on the verge of another conflict due to the Jammu and Kashmir region.  
4. Insurgencies in the Seven Sisters States 
The northeastern region of India is another very diverse and complex region, a 
feeding ground for several insurgencies. Prakash Singh puts it well, “Its northeastern 
states are to India what the Balkans are to Europe.”182 India’s northeastern states, known 
as the “Seven Sisters,” are very diverse and not well integrated with the rest of India. This 
region is geographically connected with the Indian mainland by a small stretch of land, 
the Siliguri Corridor, or commonly known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” Also, all the Seven 
Sisters states have international borders and are surrounded by five neighboring 
countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar, and Nepal. The Indian government and 
mainland of India often neglected this region, and “These states accuse New Delhi of 
apathy toward their issues. Illiteracy, poverty and lack of economic opportunities have 
fueled the natives’ demand for autonomy and independence.”183 
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Fear of losing their identities, and perceived social, political, and economic 
injustices, have led a few ethnic groups to take up arms against the state. Government 
failure to address injustices and issues around the illegal Bangladeshi migration, gave rise 
to the Bodo and ULFA insurgencies within Assam.184 Bodo resentment against 
Bangladeshi immigration and against ULFA (Bodo is an anti-ULFA movement) and the 
consequent loss of land and cultural identity is the cause of frequent riots and violence 
between Bodo and Muslim populations in Assam. Meghalaya faces rising insurgency 
problems from the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) and ULFA militants. 
Mizoram’s main concern is the Hmar Peoples Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) 
insurgency.185 Since pre-independence, the Naga people have been seeking a “sovereign 
Naga state,” as well as a “Greater Naga Area” comprising “all contiguous Naga-inhabited 
areas,” along with Nagaland. That area includes several districts of Assam, Arunachal 
Pradesh, and Manipur, and a large tract of Myanmar, which is about eight times greater 
than the current Nagaland.186 The National Socialist Council of Nagalim(Isak-Muivah) 
or NSCN (I-M) is the current organization carrying a baton for “Naga sovereignty,” 
which concerns Myanmar and neighboring states.  
The central government has implemented several approaches (both soft, political 
and development and hardline, military solution) to curb insurgencies in the northeastern 
region. New Delhi has passed a number of legislations, such as ‘Unlawful Association’ 
under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act [1967] to outlaw armed rebels, as well as 
“Declaring the most seriously insurgency-affected States [and] areas … under the Armed 
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Forces (Special Powers) Act [1958].”187 The central government deployed Central Para 
Military Forces (CPMF) to affected areas, provided economic incentive to state 
governments to fight against insurgencies, invested in infrastructure development, 
strengthened local security and police forces, implemented several development 
programs, and established security cooperation with the neighboring countries.188 All 
these efforts resulted in an improved security environment. The central government is 
able to contain and subdue a few insurgencies, but not all. In the case of some 
insurgencies, such as ULFA and Naga, their safe heavens and the support within the 
neighboring countries prolonged their campaigns. The next sections discuss India’s 
central and federalist state government’s policies toward the Naxalite insurgencies.  
B. THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY AND THE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Of all political parties, the INC party ruled India for the longest period and has the 
more experience dealing with the Naxalites and other insurgencies. As seen previously in 
different insurgencies, the government’s approach with the Naxalites is somewhat similar 
but also unique. Over the years, the Naxalite insurgency has taken on a different meaning 
for the central and state governments. Initially, it was just considered another communist 
movement that could eventually join the main political stream. Later, it became more of a 
threat to the nation than just a local problem. In 2013, while addressing a conference on 
internal security, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared, “Naxal violence has 
no place in democracy and the central and State governments must join hands to curb the 
violence by Left extremists … The Indian government has instituted several measures in 
34 Naxal-hit areas to combat the Naxal menace.”189 This statement suggests that this five 
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decades long insurgency is finally starting to demand a much deserved preference from 
the governments.  
C. THE INDIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDER THE INC 
RULE 
Even though the Indian central government has experienced several different 
kinds of insurgency, the Naxalite insurgency is unique compared to the others. Almost all 
past and current insurgencies within India had been located in one confined area, such as 
the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, the Kashmiri insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
Bodo and ULFA insurgency in Assam, and the Naga insurgency just within Nagaland. In 
comparison, the Naxalite insurgency, which has spread to almost 13 Indian states and 
hundreds of districts, has had a far broader impact. Also, in most of the insurgencies, the 
central government has utilized the Army, but in the case of the Naxalites, police and 
para-military forces have mostly been deployed. Thus, what were the policies of the 
Indian government under the control of the INC party? 
Each government has to use appropriate measures to defeat its unique 
insurgencies. According to David Kilcullen, “These measures may be political, 
administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are almost 
always used in combination.”190 Each insurgency requires a counterinsurgency approach 
that is both combined and unique to the insurgency. However, Connable and Libicki gave 
five reasons for the government’s failure: the government fails to recognize a credible 
threat or ignores it, undermines the root cause(s) of discontent, applies half-hearted 
solutions in which to address problems or is too late in addressing the issues, does not 
identify major shifts in strategic momentum, and fails to provide governmental control in 
rural areas, or becomes dependent upon an unpredictable sponsor.191 India has been using 
a multi-pronged approach to defeat the Naxalite insurgency over the last five decades, 
including social and economic development and political inclusiveness, but largely 
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depends on the military solution. Hence, on a few occasions, it found success but unable 
to eradicate the insurgency.  
The Indian government used a variety of policies toward the Naxalite insurgency 
over the three major periods of its insurgency. After India gained independence, the 
Maoist insurgency came in three different waves. The first wave was from 1948 to 1951, 
as the CPI faction, the second wave was from 1967 to 1971, as the CPI (Marxist) faction, 
and the third wave has been from 1980 to present, as the PWG, MCC, and their merger 
into CPI(M).192 In the first wave (the Pre-Naxalbari period), insurgency emerged to 
address the “grievances related to the political and socioeconomic structure of rural 
society in the plains of Telengana”193 during the Nizam’s rule in Hyderabad, and it 
continued for few years after the Indian takeover of the princely state.194 The second 
wave of insurgency picked up momentum after the Naxalbari event and ended after a 
government security forces crackdown, during the Emergency rule.195 The third wave of 
insurgency reemerged a few years after the end of Emergency rule in Andhra Pradesh and 
West Bengal, then spread to one third of India within the next two decades. This section 
discusses the policies of the Indian government under the INC rule during all three 
waves.  
                                                 
192 Jonathan Kennedy and Sunil Purushotham, “Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Independent India,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54, 
no. 4 (2012): 833, doi: 10.1017/S0010417512000436.  
193 Ibid., 836.  
194 Ibid., 842. The Emergency Rule in India: “The Emergency was set in motion by the Indira Gandhi 
government on June 25, 1975 and was in place for 21 months till its withdrawal on March 21, 1977. The 
order gave Ms. Gandhi the authority to rule by decree wherein civil liberties were curbed. An external 
Emergency was already in place even before the imposition of the internal one. The Emergency was 
officially issued by the then President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. With the suspension of the fundamental 
rights, politicians who opposed Ms. Gandhi were arrested. Threat to national security and bad economic 
conditions were cited as reasons for the declaration. In Tamil Nadu, the Karunanidhi government was 
dissolved. The DMK leader’s son M. K. Stalin was arrested amidst protests under the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act.” “Emergency: The Dark Age of Indian Democracy,” updated June 27, 2015, http:// 
www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/the-emergency-imposed-by-indira-gandhi-government/article735 
7305.ece. 
195 Ibid.  
 50 
1. Pre-Naxalbari Insurgency (1946–1951)  
During the first wave of the Naxalite insurgency, the INC government pursued a 
dual-pronged approach; however, it heavily relied on a military solution, and seldom-
used soft approach, development measures.196 In mid-September 1948, after the Nizam 
of Hyderabad surrendered the Indian government, the newly appointed military governor 
ordered the deployment of the following security forces, two Army brigades and more 
than 9,000 policemen, a few battalions from the Hyderabad Army, as well as two cavalry 
squadron.197 An Indian special commissioner successfully advocated for an improved 
development program along with the strong police action, to win the “hearts and 
minds.”198 According to Jonathan Kennedy and Sunil Purushotham, “The proposed 
development measures included construction and repair of irrigation tanks, sinking of 
wells, provision of medical aid, opening of schools, distribution of food and other 
essential commodities, and, most importantly, agrarian reform legislation.”199 Some 
experts argue that wining “hearts and minds,” essentially brought down the insurgency; 
however, the government did not implement development measures properly or 
sufficiently. In addition, due to harsh police actions, this initial insurgency fizzled in 
Hyderabad but spread out to the neighboring regions, where it was not totally defeated. 
During this first period of insurgency, the government’s development programs 
designed to benefit its own counterinsurgency efforts rather than to address the root cause 
of the insurgency, displaced and dissented Adivasi people. The administration 
constructed hundreds of miles of roads to improve infrastructures, but ended up just 
providing security forces better access into internal areas.200 The government forcibly 
removed aboriginal people in the name of development, but most moved to basic 
roadside camps, where many died due to various diseases and a lack of medical aid.201 In 
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another counterinsurgency measure, the government created home guard units and 
distributed firearms. These units became mercenaries, also known as “tiger squads,” 
tasked to kill suspected insurgents.202 The government security forces also used false 
“encounters” to kill suspected insurgents, and ended up murdering more suspected 
communists, than captured.203 All these counterinsurgency efforts were able to 
marginalize the Maoist insurgency but were unable to destroy it.  
2. Immediate Years after the Naxalbari Incident (1967–1975)  
After subduing the initial uprising in 1951, dissatisfaction and dissent among the 
tribal and poor people continued slowly brewing, finally coming to a tipping point when 
the Naxalbari incident took place; thus began the second wave of insurgency. In March 
1967, when a landlord prevented a tribal peasant from ploughing his land, a violent 
protest among landless peasants was triggered, killing a police inspector. The radical 
Maoist followers exploited this event and recruited more than 20,000 peasants for a 
violent takeover of the land. They soon occupied hundreds of acres land, burned nearly 
all records of debt and dues, looted the landlords of their weapons, and passed death 
sentences on alleged hardliner landlords.204 The insurgents now claimed control over a 
vast territory. At the same time, in March 1967, the UF, a communist coalition, won the 
state assembly elections and sworn into govern the Indian state of West Bengal.205 
Initially, the UF government wanted to negotiate with the rebels but under pressure from 
the center, they had to take police actions, which are covered in detail in the section on 
the West Bengal government response. However, the central government regarded this 
situation as a law and order problem rather than treating it as socioeconomic and political 
issues.206 Hence, the central and the Indian state of West Bengal relied more on police 
actions to establish security, and did not try to solve the actual problems, which had 
caused the insurgency in the first place.  
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According to Raman Dixit, “When the Naxal uprising began in 1967, the Indian 
government looked at it as a law and order problem. It did not analyze the causes of the 
movement and the extent of mobilization of people. Hence, it believed that it could and 
would put an end to it in a short span of time using force.”207 Treating the Naxalite 
insurgency as a law and order problem allowed the Indian central government to use a 
heavy-handed approach with strong police actions. In July 1967, the federalist state 
government with help from the center launched a massive police operation, quickly 
defeating the insurgency in the Naxalbari area.208 However, the Naxalbari incident had 
already ignited a fire among the Maoist rebels in neighboring states and they started to 
take up arms against the state. In the Srikakulam district in Andhra Pradesh, large Adivasi 
populations, also known as girijans, influenced by the AICCCR leader Majumdar  and 
the Naxalbari event, adopted guerrilla tactics.209 By 1969, Girijan Sangham insurgents 
claimed control of nearly 300 villages, a total of 700 to 800 square miles.210 Between 
1971 and 1975, during the President’s Rule211 and the Emergency rule, the central 
government sent 10,000 paramilitary forces, and along with the help of the Andhra 
Pradesh state police, it was able to crush the insurgency. In a simple counterinsurgency 
strategy, they burnt several villages to the ground, killed numerous important leaders in 
alleged “encounters,” while others were detained, defeating the movement.212  
In India, law and order are individual state’s responsibility but the center used a 
loophole in the constitution, declaring the President’s Rule and taking over for the state. 
In 1971, the INC government led by Gandhi also imposed the President’s Rule. Gandhi’s 
                                                 
207 Dixit, “Naxalite Movement in India,” 22. 
208 Kennedy and Purushotham, “Beyond Naxalbari,” 846.  
209 Ibid., 849.  
210 Ibid.  
211 The President’s Rule: “Article 356 is inspired by sections 93 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, which provided that if a Governor of a province was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the 
government of the province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, he could 
assume to himself all or any of the powers of the government and discharge those functions in his 
discretion. The Governor, however, could not encroach upon the powers of the high court.” Seema Chishti, 
“What is Article 356?,” The Indian Express, updated January 27, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/ 
explained/article-356-use-misuse/. 
212 Kennedy and Purushotham, “Beyond Naxalbari,” 849.  
 53 
government was riding on the victory wave after liberating Bangladesh; therefore, it sent 
massive security enforcement to West Bengal. In addition, during the Emergency rule, 
the central government marginalized the Naxalite insurgency by taking the following 
steps. It introduced a series of laws to empower the police, who now with boosted 
security support, could cordon off the area and search house by house. The government 
separated non-committed insurgents and offered them police jobs, included them in the 
INC party, or had them join the Home Guards. Once they identified the Naxalites, the 
government either killed or held in custody indefinitely. Kennedy and Purushotham 
suggest, “In July 1972, Charu Majumdar  died in police custody. The CPI (Marxist-
Leninist) fragmented into numerous groups … this marked the end of the second 
wave.”213 By 1975, the Naxalite insurgents and their leaders had died, been jailed, or 
went underground. However, it was not the end of the Naxalite insurgency.  
3. Resurgence of the Naxalites (1990–Present) 
After 1975, most of the Naxalite insurgency was defeated either due to police 
actions, social and economic development, or political solutions. As discussed in the 
previous section, the government detained or killed many insurgent leaders during the 
Emergency rule. However, after the Emergency rule, Indira Gandhi’s government 
suffered a severe defeat at the center, as well as at the states’ level that gave the 
insurgents an opportunity for to come out from hiding. After releasing from the jail, many 
leaders started to rebuild the armed struggle.214 It took another decade and a half for the 
Naxalite movement really to expand in several eastern and southern states. Kennedy and 
Purushotham observed, “From 1990 onward the insurgency spread from Andhra Pradesh 
and Bihar to contiguous areas of the central tribal belt in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Orissa, and what became Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in 2001.”215 Also in the 1990s, the 
government of India changed its economic policy and adopted the open market economy. 
Asad Ismi points out, “The insurgency stems from the Indian government’s turn to 
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neoliberal capitalism that began in 1991 and which has massively increased poverty and 
inequality in the country, especially to the detriment of farmers and Adivasis.”216 This 
economic policy change increased the division between classes even more, and the 
government started to bring several private companies into the Naxalite affected area to 
mine natural resources. All these new developments provided more motives for the 
insurgency to resurface.  
Since the 1990s, the central government has taken several steps to strengthen the 
states affected by the Naxalite insurgency and to enhance security toward its law and 
order approach. Under a police modernization scheme, the central government provided 
funding to the state government to modernize their weapons, gear, communication, 
transportation, and infrastructure facilities.217 The center provided mine protected 
vehicles to protect against improvised explosive devices, extended 36 battalions of CPMF 
deployed to help the state governments, relieved state governments from paying a charge 
regarding CPMF worth almost $200 million, increased special forces to 14,000 
personnel, set up the Indian reserve battalions, increased the funding for each battalion 
and deployed massive security forces along the Indo-Nepal border to prevent the 
Nepalese Maoists from helping the Indian Maoists.218 The central government also 
provided a few helicopters with pilots, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for 
reconnaissance and intelligence, and hired around 5,000 ex-servicemen to conduct and 
supervise mine sweeping operations.219 Hence, the Indian central government invested a 
significant number of personnel and funding for the cause of law and order. The central 
government would also either encouraged the rise of the special forces units, such as the 
Greyhound forces of Andhra Pradesh or ignored the state sponsored militia, such as 
Salwa Judum to boost its effort to bring so called law and order. They also launched 
special operations, such as the “Operation Green Hunt.”220  
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4. Socio-economic Development Approach  
In the late 1990s, the Indian government realized that the use of police action 
alone was not sufficient to diminish the insurgency; rather, it would also need to 
concentrate on the social and economic development of this region. This dual-pronged 
policy strategy came down from the top level of government. The former Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out, “[the] Naxalite insurgency should not be viewed 
as a purely law and order problem: underlying this insurgency, and lending it support, 
was the social and economic deprivation experienced by a significant part of India’s 
population.”221 In 2003–2004, the central government provided a sum of $40 million to 
55 areas of nine states, by starting the backward districts initiative and the Backward 
Regions Grant Fund (BRGF). These participant states have the highest areas of poverty 
and under-development.222 Later, the government included 250 districts and other Naxal 
affected areas under the BRGF by providing another about $80 million.223 The 
government also launched several initiatives including the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana to develop road infrastructures, the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
program to increase employment, and several health and education initiatives in which to 
develop the Naxal affected region.224 From 2010 to 2012, the government also 
implemented integrated action plans by allocating approximately $700 million for 
development projects in this region.225 The government began focusing on providing 
good governance and began investing in building roads and fortifying police stations, all 
to increase the states’ capacity to project power.226 These developmental efforts can 
bring positive change if all the development programs can implemented without lengthy 
bureaucratic processes or corrupt practices.  
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D. THE INDIAN FEDERALIST STATE GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSES 
Arguably, if the central government and the state governments work in harmony 
then they are most likely to defeat insurgency, but as in most cases, they do not work 
together for many reasons, including political, fundamental, or leadership issues. From 
the beginning of independence, the INC ruled over all India, both in the center and at the 
state level. However, soon after one decade of independence, the INC started losing 
control over state governments, especially in the Naxalite affected areas. The state 
government mostly complied with the center’s demands and approach, but it also used its 
own political, social and economic power to deal with the Naxalite insurgency.  
1. Andhra Pradesh 
Out of all the states, Andhra Pradesh is the most successful in conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in eradicating the Naxalite insurgency. Andhra Pradesh was 
the only state to recognize the Naxalite insurgency as a serious threat. Therefore, it has 
invested in the Greyhounds, an elite anti-Maoist commando unit prepared for a 
counterinsurgency response, based on a full understanding of the Maoist “protracted war” 
model, trained in guerrilla warfare to combat and defeat the insurgency.227 The state 
government has integrated work and training of the state police force with the Greyhound 
forces to boost recruitment. It has also created several programs to help police personnel 
and their families if killed in the line of duty. At the same time, the state government 
provided comprehensive rehabilitation packages to repatriate the former Maoists. The 
Andhra Pradesh model follows an “explore-and-evolve strategy,” a carrot-and-stick 
policy to discourage prospective supporters of the Maoists.228 
Andhra Pradesh’s counterinsurgency policy is unmatched in the entire nation, 
especially with such a strong police action force. In 1987, the state started to fund a well-
trained specialized force, the Greyhound force. By 2010, to boost recruitment efforts and 
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sustain the Greyhound forces, “the state has insured all 121,343 police personnel for Rs 
65.69 crore [US $10 million).”229 It has also established the rehabilitation packages for 
families of those policemen “killed on duty, the legal heir is paid the last pay drawn till 
the date of superannuation, allowed to retain government accommodation, given a 
government job, a house site besides a cash grant ranging from Rs 9 lakhs [US $15,000] 
to Rs 12 lakhs [US $ 20,000].”230 In addition, the Greyhounds receive 60 percent more 
pay than normal.231 Sameer Lalwani confirms, “The 2,000-strong Greyhound force is 
better paid and equipped than federal or state paramilitary forces, operating with state of 
the art weapons and technology, better trained in jungle warfare, and moves in nimbler, 
highly capable units to target, track, and destroy insurgent networks by modeling 
guerrilla tactics.”232 
At the same time, the state has created rehabilitation packages for the ex-Maoists, 
and also updated the police infrastructure, as well as augmented the entire Andhra police 
force to support the Greyhounds. To rehabilitate former Maoist insurgents and their 
influential leaders and supporters, the state is helping them to rebuild their lives by 
providing access to employment and small business opportunities in which to generate 
income.233 All new recruited police officers are required to train with the Greyhounds 
and serve with them for three years before going to their regular unit.234 The state has 
also built fortified police stations with protective walls, proper lighting, and guards.235 
The state government is supporting the Greyhounds forces with logistical support, and 
most importantly, a deeply rooted intelligence network. As a result, Naxalite activities 
have dropped from 1,200 in 2005 to 500 in 2008 and 600 attacks in 2003 to just around 
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100 in 2010.236 In addition, according to Saurabh Singhal and Rahul Nilakantan, Andhra 
Pradesh’s counterinsurgency policy, “yielded a ‘security dividend’ equal on average to 
16.11% of its per capita net state domestic product … over the period 1989 to 2000.”237 
Even Prime Minister Singh suggested that all the Naxalite affected states should build the 
special task forces, such as the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh to tackle the Maoist 
insurgents.238 
2. Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha 
The Naxalite insurgency entered later in these three states: Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, and Odisha (formerly known as Orissa); however, they are the worst affected 
states due to their geography and demography. The Maoist armed struggle started in West 
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh in the beginning, but due to a heavy crackdown by the state 
police and central para-military forces, the Naxalite insurgents spilled over to these 
neighboring states. Since these states have a large population of tribal people, massive 
poverty, and forested rough terrain, they were the perfect locations for the insurgents to 
hide and grow. None of these states has a strong counterinsurgency policy or any 
comprehensive approach. Chhattisgarh has applied similar guerrilla tactics to deal with 
the Naxalite insurgents. Jharkhand has conducted several offensive operations with the 
help of the center and tried to ban Maoist organizations, but have to achieve expected 
results. Orissa does not have any comprehensive counterinsurgency policies to deal with 
the Naxalite insurgency. The state has been promising land reforms that have not yet 
implemented. All three states are rich with natural resources, and competing economic 
interests make the situation worse.  
Without any effective counterinsurgency strategy, the Chhattisgarh state 
government indirectly supported a so called “spontaneous people’s uprising against the 
Maoist” known as Salwa Judum ‘purification hunt’ to deal with the Naxalite 
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insurgency.239 In 2005, the Salwa Judum movement originated to mobilize people 
against the Maoists. After Mahendra Karama (Congress MLA from Dantewada and 
leader of the opposition in the state assembly) took control of the Salwa Judum and 
supported by the BJP state government, the movement started to take its own shape. 
According to Nandini Sundar:  
The government has appointed some 3,500 special police officers, many 
of them minors, equipped them with lathis [sticks], bows and arrows and 
.303 rifles, supposedly to counter the Naxalites. Many were attracted by 
the promise of Rs 1,500 a month, the machismo of weapons, and the hope 
of getting permanent employment in the police force.240  
The rise of the Salwa Judum created a war-like situation between the Maoists and 
the members of this group. Both sides are squeezing the poor tribal people; the 
government is favoring the Salwa Judum. By 2006, according to government figures, at 
least 268 civilians were killed and 706 injured by Maoists.241 According to the Maoists, 
Salwa Judum killed 116 civilians and 72 police personnel, and 30 Naxalites.242 However, 
the government has lost control over the Salwa Judum and its activities; consequently, it 
is running a parallel government. The state government has also banned the CPI (Maoist) 
party from operating freely in the state.  
Jharkhand is one of the worst Naxal hit areas and has become a “laboratory” for 
the Naxalite insurgency. Rajat Kumar Kujur suggests, “The Naxals have transformed 16 
out of the 22 districts of the state into a ‘guerrilla zone,’”243 In addition, the Naxal 
established a parallel system of governance. According to Kujur, they have “claimed the 
lives of nearly 700 people so far, which includes over 200 policemen.”244 Poverty and a 
sense of injustice drive the people toward the Maoist movement. The state has launched 
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multiple offensives including Operation Eagle, Operation X, Operation Shikhar, 
Operation Hill Top, and Operation Thunder, but none of them has made any significant 
difference.245 The state government tried to ban the MCC and PWG but did not block 
their merger into the CPI (Maoist) and is therefore not able to stop its influence. 
Arguably, for the government efforts in countering the Maoist influence to succeed, it 
needs to revise its strategy to address the socioeconomic issues of tribal people.  
The Naxalite movement has established deep roots in Odisha because of the acute 
poverty and rampart corruption. In addition, the state government does not have solid 
counterinsurgency policies to deal with it. Odisha shares borders with Chhattisgarh and 
Andhra Pradesh. These neighboring states clamped down on the CPI (Maoist) insurgency 
by using the Greyhound forces in the Andhra Pradesh and the Salwa Judum militia in 
Chhattisgarh; hence, the Naxalites shifted their hideouts and camps to Odisha. Kujur 
points out, “the Orissa government has neither banned nor engaged the Naxals in 
talks;”246 there is no significant progress in countering the insurgency. Several 
developmental and reconciliation programs are announced by the government but have 
not been fully (or properly) implemented to be effective.247  
3. West Bengal 
The Naxalite insurgency began in the state of West Bengal and spread to other 
parts of India. However, it can be argued that this state is the most successful in wiping 
out the insurgency. One of the main reasons for this success is that out of all the states 
affected by the Naxalites, only West Bengal had a communist parties’ rule from the 
beginning. Hence, it had several advantages over other states in dealing with the Maoist 
movement. Although this state experienced all three waves of insurgency, the first two 
periods were affected the most and not so much by the third, because it was able to 
address the grievances of poor and tribal people more effectively than the other states.  
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After the 1967 Naxalbari event, the Maoist armed struggle quickly spread thought 
out the tribal and poor areas of West Bengal, but it was quickly putdown by violent 
military action. In the 1950s and 1960s, the CPI(M) discouraged militancy, advocating 
instead for a peaceful transition to socialism. Henceforth, followers of Mao’s ideology 
separated to form a new party.248 In 1967, the UF coalition led by the CPI(M) formed a 
first non-Congress government in West Bengal.249 The same day, the UF took control of 
the government, and violence broke out in Naxalbari. Initially, the UF government 
wanted to work with their demands but under pressure from the center, they had to take a 
police action.250 In July 1967, police operations began and quickly subdued the 
insurgency.251 The state government also received help from the central government in 
the form of an increased amount of troops and equipment to provide security against the 
insurgents.252 The state police used an effective counterinsurgency tactic by dividing 
urban insurgents into three categories. The first were “non-committed Naxalite students” 
given employment by the state in police jobs or who joined Gandhi’s Congress party.253 
The second were criminal elements asked to join the Home Guards for 150 rupees per 
month. The third were the loyal supporters and activists of the insurgency who were shot 
or detained indefinitely.254 According to Kennedy and Purushotham, “This strategy was 
remarkably successful; by the beginning of 1972 the movement’s support base was 
destroyed and almost all top leaders were either dead or in prison.”255 
The CPI(M) represented themselves as the only legitimate representative of the 
poor and suppressed people, which helped the CPI to increase its base support during the 
insurgency period. At the same time, the insurgents were unable to generate the mass 
support they needed to continue their movement. The CPI won 43 seats out of 280 in 
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1967, 80 seats in 1969, and 113 seats in 1971 state elections.256 Post Emergency rule 
(from 1977), the CPI(M) led the leftist government to power and remained in power for 
the next three decades. During this period, the leftist government carried out several 
reforms, and introduced many land laws and such reforms to give better rights and 
security to sharecroppers. The government made positive efforts in a massive campaign 
to register and educate sharecropper for their rights.257 Sharecroppers were given 
“inheritable rights” to cultivate their land. In addition, the state government acquired 
surplus lands and distributed them to landless peasants. This strategy was very effective 
in curbing the attraction of the Naxalite insurgency; hence, the leftist government was 
able to rule West Bengal for more than three decades. Stable, with relatively good 
governance and the support of the police actions, the government of West Bengal was 
able to remove the majority of the insurgents from state territory.  
E. CONCLUSION  
Over the years, the Naxalite insurgency has learned to adopt the government 
counterinsurgency efforts and has become irrepressible, spreading slowly but surely to 
more areas of India. Violent activities from this insurgency were at a peak during the 
1960s and 1970s, and later in the 1990s. However, the number of violent events and 
fatalities due to the Naxalites has decreased over the last decade or so; although, it has 
dispersed to more states and district than ever before. According to one statistic, more 
than one-third to 40 percent of India is under the influence of the Maoists. However, the 
Naxalite insurgency severely affected only a few districts in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and 
Orissa.  
The Indian central government led by the INC and the state governments have 
carried out a long counterinsurgency policy, in which they had mixed results most of the 
time using strong military actions to engage the Naxalite insurgents. Due to police 
repression, the insurgents are moving one place to another to deny the state authorities an 
upper hand. The central and the state governments have implemented several 
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developmental programs to discourage tribal people form joining the Maoists. However, 
due to corrupt bureaucratic practices of the government programs or improper 
implementation, tribal populations are even wearier of the government. Out of the five 
states discussed in this chapter, only Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are successful in 
counterinsurgency operations; other states are struggling to contain it. Strong military 
action has not worked effectively so far. To be successful, the government would have to 
use a dual-pronged or multi-pronged approach, which should include social, economic, 
and political justice, with appropriate police actions against the military arm of the 
insurgency. The next chapter focuses on the current BJP-led central government’s history 
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IV. THE NEW BJP GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD 
THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY FROM 2014 
Within its eight decades old democratic system, India witnessed one of its biggest 
political turnovers in 2014, when the Hindu nationalist BJP won a clear majority in the 
parliamentary general election. For the first time in Indian political history, some party 
other than the INC party was able to win a clear majority and form a central government 
in New Delhi. A couple of times before 2014, the BJP was able to form a central 
government through a coalition with other parties, known as the NDA. Even though the 
BJP is known for its aggressive and hawkish approach in dealing with domestic and 
international issues, it had to tone down its rhetoric due to its dependence on other 
parties; thereby, unable to execute everything within their own agenda. Since the BJP has 
a clear majority within parliament, most likely it will be able to operate without 
constraints. While it was in the opposition, the BJP constantly criticized the INC and the 
dealings of its coalition government in containing the Naxalite insurgency and favored a 
more hardline approach. Therefore, this chapter addresses BJP’s policies towards the 
Naxalites by asking, is BJP’s approach different from that of previous governments?  
This chapter has four major sections. The first section provides a brief history of 
the BJP, and its accession to power in the central government. The second section 
examines BJP’s activities as an opposition party and its demands for aggressive action, 
making it a hawkish party. The third section reviews the history of the NDA coalition’s 
approach towards the Naxalites, while it was in power at the center from 1998 to 2004. 
Finally, this chapter looks at the current BJP government’s policies on paper, its actual 
approach, and its outcomes so far. 
A. THE BJP HISTORY AND ITS PATH TO VICTORY IN 2014  
In the general elections of 2014, the Hindu nationalist party BJP under the 
leadership of its prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi was able to achieve a clear 
mandate to rule India for the next five years. Since its creation in 1980, it had only been 
marginally successful, limited to a small percentage of people in Hindi speaking states 
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known as the “Hindi belt.” In the last three decades, it was the first time any single party 
in India was able to win a decisive majority of seats, in the general election for Lok 
Sabha (House of the People), the lower house of India’s bicameral-parliament, with the 
higher house being the Rajya Sabha). In addition, since India’s independence, it was the 
first time any party other than the INC had achieved this milestone. The Modi 
government accepted responsibility for running a very diverse country that is enjoying 
many successes on the international stage and in the global economy. At the same time, 
Modi’s new government also must address several protracted domestic problems, 
including a growing population, poverty, an energy crisis, and insurgencies. A few of the 
protracted insurgencies requiring immediate attention from the new government include 
those in Kashmir, in the Seven Sister states of the northeast, and the Naxalite insurgency.  
In its first two decades, the BJP had marginal success and was only limited to the 
Hindi-language belt. Since 1998, the BJP has started to gain support outside of the Hindi 
belt. Historically, outside of the Hindi belt, especially in the eastern and southern states of 
India, the BJP was considered a party of Hindi speakers and upper castes. By 1990, the 
BJP had captured the assemblies of five states, and by 2014, it controlled eight state 
assemblies.258 Since 1984, the BJP continued to improve its performance and increase its 
constituency in successive general elections. In the 1984 general election for Lok Sabha, 
the BJP was only able to win a single seat in two states with 7.74 percent of the vote; by 
the 1998 elections, it won 182 seats in 20 states with 25.59 percent of the vote. During 
the last general election in 2014, it won 282 seats in 26 states with 31.34 percent of the 
vote, becoming the largest national party.259  
To attract voters, the BJP implemented different strategies within different 
federalist states. The BJP expanded in the northeast, the east, and the south of India, by 
exploiting issues, such as economic growth, national security, and anti-immigrant 
messages. Although its messages regarding such issues were framed as a threat to the 
Hindus, it was not clear however that the Hindu messages were what gained it support 
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because in each area, the platform targeted issues specific to the region. In the last 
general election of 2014, Prime Minister Candidate Modi’s popularity and his message of 
progress, especially anti-corruption, economic growth, building India, and good 
governance, played a significant role in the BJP’s surge.260  
The BJP, a Hindu nationalist party of India, claimed to be the “most prominent 
member of the family of organizations known as the ‘Sangh Parivar’, nurtured by the 
RSS.”261 The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS—Indian People’s Association) was the original 
political party before the creation of the BJP. In 1951, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee 
founded the BJS with the support of the RSS.262 After independence, the BJS advocated 
rebuilding a strong unified state according to Hindu culture. In 1967, the BJS began to 
gain a strong foothold in northern India. In January 1977, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
announced elections were to be held in March, after lifting the emergency rule.263 
Immediately, the BJS and three other parties formed a coalition, and the chairman of the 
Janata party was Morarji Desai.264 The Janata party won 295 out of 542 seats in Lok 
Sabha and took control of the government.265 In July 1979, this coalition and government 
collapsed due to internal factions and conflicts associated with the clash between the BJP 
and the left parties. In 1980, following the collapse of the Janata party, the BJP was 
formally established. The Sangh Parivar strongly supported the BJP. Major organizations 
in the Sangh Parivar include the RSS, VHP, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad 
(ABVP—All Indian Student Council), Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (Indian Farmer’s 
Organization), and Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Labor Organization). The Sangh 
Parivar’s goal (and promise) behind the Hindu nationalist movement is to establish a 
Ram Rajya.  
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After its birth, the BJP experienced a major setback in the first general election of 
1984. To distance itself from the BJS (and the RSS) and to widen its base, then party 
president Atal Bihari Vajpayee proposed the party’s new creed, “Gandhian socialism” 
and “positive secularism.”266 The BJP featured a more inclusive agenda, including 
inflation and corruption in its campaign theme, and avoided the mention of Hindu 
nationalism. Unfortunately, on October 31, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh 
bodyguards assassinated her, which caused a major political shift that greatly affected the 
new party. Consequently, in the December 1984 general election, Indira’s son, Rajiv 
Gandhi, and the INC, won a huge majority within parliament (415 out of 542 seats). 
Scholars argue that this win was largely sympathetic in nature, and because Rajiv was a 
young, new face; the INC wiped out all the other parties.267 Moreover, at this time, Rajiv 
Gandhi started to visit temples in public, which divided the Hindu nationalist and RSS 
supporters. Consequently, the BJP lost the support of the RSS in that election. For the 
BJP, it was a major setback; even though it included a more inclusive message, it won 
only two seats in parliament and lost a few seats in the state assemblies.268  
After the 1984 losses, the BJP returned to its Hindutva roots. The BJP started to 
work very closely with the RSS and the VHP to develop its ethno-religious strategy. 
Although to maintain its secular façade, the BJP continued to promote Atal B. Vajpayee 
and L. K. Advani, relatively moderate Hindu nationalists, as the faces and voice of the 
party. The BJP decided to exploit the issue of Ram Janmabhoomi with the help of the 
Sangh Parivar’s extensive network of volunteers to provoke a massive mobilization of 
Hindus.269 Without any archaeological evidence, Hindu nationalists claimed that a Ram 
temple “stood on this holy site and was supposedly demolished in 1528 at the order of 
Babur (the founder of the Mughal dynasty) in order to build a mosque, the Babri 
Masjid.”270 In the 1850s, Hindu organizations tried to exploit this issue for the first time, 
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but it did not gain any traction. In the late 1980s, the Sangh Parivar worked out a concrete 
plan to mobilize the enormous masses of Hindus to hold onto their support.  
Finally, the BJP’s grand strategy of capturing a Hindu vote started to gain 
momentum, which resulted in capturing 182 parliamentary seats in the 1998 election. By 
1998, with its methodical and disciplined approach, the RSS had already expanded its 
network to 1.8 million volunteers, distributed between 25,000 branches in 18,890 
different locations, covering 250,000 villages, almost half of the entire country beyond 
the Hindi belt.271 The VHP also had a large devout following throughout the country. 
The triple network of the BJP, the RSS, and the VHP was ready to accomplish almost any 
task it was offered.  
In the next couple of decades, the BJP and its Sangh Parivar used multiple 
techniques to build grassroots support, to establish Ram Rajya. Under the leadership of 
Advani, the BJP and its affiliates used the tool of yatra to expand their base. In 1991, 
Murli Manohar Joshi launched Ekta Yatra (National Unity Rally) to raise the Kashmir 
issue. Advani steered multiple yatras. In 1993, the Janadesh Yatra (People’s Mandate 
Rally) was led against the Constitution’s 80th Amendment Bill and the Representation of 
People (Amendment) Bill; in 1997, the Swarn Jayanti Rath Yatra celebrated the golden 
jubilee of independence of 2004; in 2006, Bharat Uday Yatra was organized to celebrate 
a rising India; the Bharat Suraksha Yatra was led to draw attention to threats to national 
security; and in 2011, the Jan Chetna Yatra (Awakening People’s Conscious Rally) was 
led to take on the UPA government on the corruption issue and to press for the return of 
black market money stashed away abroad. Above all, in 1990, Advani began the most 
controversial cross-country yatra “the communally divisive and provocative Ram Rath 
Yatra … demanding a Ram temple at the Babri Masjid site.”272 This yatra managed to 
polarize India, which led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid two years later, in a 
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devastating chain of events.273 The BJP leaders chose the time and theme of yatra to 
maximize the political yield for the party and themselves.  
Heightened Hindu identity and rhetoric against Muslims and other minorities 
created tensions between religious communities that led to communal riots throughout 
India. On December 6, 1992, the VHP organized more than 200,000 Hindu karsevaks 
gathered in the disputed area of Ram Janmabhoomi and Babri Masjid to construct the 
Ram Temple.274 The situation got out of control, leading to the demolition of the 
mosque, with communal riots erupting throughout India. As a result, more than 2,000 
people lost their lives.275 Demolition of the Babri Masjid reflected badly on the current 
central ruling party (the INC) and helped to build momentum for the BJP, which 
eventually led it to power in the 1998 general elections. Interestingly, the INC lost 
Muslim support in the country as a result because they felt that the party was not able to 
protect them. The country saw an emergence of a third front at this point, which is critical 
to understanding the loss of the INC in the country, as many minorities and lower caste 
supporters of the INC, saw the third front as an option. In other words, the BJP’s victory 
has to be also understood in terms of losses for the INC, as it supporters shifted to other 
parties including some towards the BJP. 
Most strategies used by the BJP were effective within the Hindi belt among upper 
castes, but proved to be relatively ineffective outside of the northern Indian states.276 
Therefore, the BJP had to come up with unique strategies according to each non-Hindi 
speaking state. If the BJP wanted to capture power in New Delhi, it had to win Lok Sabha 
seats beyond the Hindi belt. States located in the northeast, the east, and south of India 
are outside of the Hindi belt, the home of different languages, culture, and political party 
affiliations. These states and people have their own problems and concerns, which may or 
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may not be related to the northern Indian people, nor understood by the BJP. Even though 
the Hindu religion is a big part of their lives, the construction of a Ram Mandir (temple) 
was not their priority. In addition, communist parties or local parties are more popular in 
these states, and they are the longtime rulers of these states; thus, the BJP had to use 
different strategies to make headway in these states. The BJP used issues, such as 
immigration, security, corruption, and progress to gain popularity outside of the Hindi 
belt.  
Dravidian languages, which are distinct from Indo-aryan languages, such as 
Hindi, dominate the southern states of India, and the local politics of these states have a 
long history of anti-Brahmin, caste politics. In addition, most of the local parties rose to 
dominance through their anti-Hindi stance, as Hindi was associated with Sanskrit and 
Brahmins.277 In comparison, the BJP was known as the party of the Hindu heartland and 
the party for the upper caste. Therefore, the BJP’s Hindu nationalism and ideology did 
not resonate among the people of southern India. Hence, the BJP adopted different tactics 
including the caste dynamics to make inroads in these states.  
1. Karnataka: Making Inroads 
The BJP gained significant electoral support among the non-Hindi speakers in the 
state of Karnataka, and was able to create its strongest base. In the 1984 general election, 
the BJP had no representative from Karnataka with only 4.68 percent of the vote, and in 
comparison, in the 2014 general election, it won 17 seats and 43.37 percent of the 
vote.278 This impressive improvement over the years suggests that the BJP finally made 
inroads into the politics of an important southern constituency. Caste continues to be an 
important factor in this state with 18 percent of the Scheduled Castes: 12.5 percent 
Muslims, 9.8 percent Lingayats, 8.16 percent Vokkaligas, 7.1 percent Kurubas, 7 percent 
Schedule Tribes, and only 2.1 percent Brahmins.279  
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Scheduled Castes  180 10.8 18 
Muslims 84 7.5 12.5 
Lingayats 90 5.9 9.8 
Vokkaligas 10 4.9 8.16 
Kurubas  - 4.3 7.1 
ST  105 4.2  7 
Brahmins - 1.3  2.1 
The percentage has been calculated with Karnataka’s population as 60 million, although the 2011 Census 
shows the state population as 61 million. 
 
The BJP adopted the caste system politics of these states and placed its Hinduva 
ideology on the back burner to gain support. In the 1991 general election, the INC and 
Janata Dal, the two most powerful parties in the state, nominated Brahmin candidates in 
the Bengaluru South Lok Sabha seats, while the BJP nominated a Vokkalinga candidate 
since the Vokkalingas are the most numerically powerful caste in this constituency.281 In 
Tumkur, the BJP exploited communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims and ran a 
strong candidate.282 The BJP applied a similar strategy in other constituencies and won 
big. In addition, following the implementation of the Mandal Commission report,283 the 
dominating communities of Lingayats and Vokkaliga felt that their own parties, the INC 
and Janata Dal, abandoned them; hence, they switched to the BJP’s camp. In the next 
decade and half, the BJP championed the caste politics to win 19 seats in 2009 and 17 
seats in the 2014 general elections.  
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2. Andhra Pradesh: Forming Coalitions 
In Andhra Pradesh, the BJP strategized about creating an alliance with the local 
popular party, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), and placed lower caste and minorities on 
the ticket to win their support. As a result, the BJP’s performance has improved 
moderately in this state since 1998. The INC used to be very popular in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh until it started to decline in the 1990s. Andhra Pradesh also has strong 
regional parties, the TDP and Telangana Rashtra Samithi(TRS). Until the 1998, the BJP 
struggled to make inroads in Andhra Pradesh, due to a strong INC presence, and an 
equally good showing of the TDP and TRS parties.  
The BJP’s success has been significant since its creation. In 1980, the BJP did not 
have any seats in the state assembly elections and received only 2.76 percent of the total 
vote, but it did show a big jump in 1999, winning 12 seats and 3.67 percent of the total 
vote.284 In the Lok Sabha elections, the BJP won one seat each in 1984 and 1991, but 
suddenly jumped to win four seats in 1998 and three seats in 2014, and for the rest of the 
elections years, did not win any seats.285 Although its voter turnout steadily increased 
from 2.2 percent in 1984 to 18.3 percent in 1998, and declined again but gained some 
momentum due to the Modi wave, it received 8.52 percent of the vote.286 The BJP’s 
success was due to its alliance with the TDP and decline of the INC. The BJP took 
advantage of the polarization between Muslims and non-Telugu speaking Hindus to win 
the Secunderabad seat in 1984.287 R. Upadhyay argues that “improved parliamentary poll 
performance of the BJP in Andhra Pradesh from four seats in 1998 to seven in 1999 
could be partly attributed to its tactical poll alliance with Telugu Desam Party (TDP), the 
ruling regional party in the state,” along with an anti-Congress party wave of 
sentiment.288 The BJP also changed its strategy in the 2014 election to field candidates 
from minorities, even Muslims, Dalit, and the backward class to see success.  
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3. Orissa: Priming the Base 
The BJP with its affiliates have long struggled to build and establish a strong 
political base in Orissa. The Sangh Parivar is building schools all over the state, and the 
RSS and Bajrang Dal help run these schools. The Sangh Parivar is aggressively recruiting 
members for all its affiliate organizations. Orissa, with the population of 37 million, 
continues to battle issues including poverty, a very low literacy rate, massive 
unemployment, and the Naxalite insurgency.  
The Sangh Parivar is working meticulously to convert Orissa into a Hindu state. 
By 2003, in Orissa, the Sangh Parivar had spread throughout the state: 100,000 plus RSS 
members, 60,000 VHP members, 20,000 Bajrang Dal members, 450,000 BJP members, 
182,000 Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh cadres, 30,000 Bharatiya Kisan Sangh members, and 
20,000 ABVP student members.289 The Sangh actively works and promotes anti-Muslim 
and anti-Christian sentiments to ignite enmity between Dalits, Adivasi, Muslims, and 
Christians.290 In addition, many women’s organizations linked to the Sangh Parivar are 
very active in this state. The RSS created the Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Shiksha 
Sansthan (all India learning centers) network that focuses on moral, extracurricular, and 
physical education for “mind, body and spirit.” This center runs 391 schools, with more 
than 110,000 students in Orissa. In these schools, “history, science, geography, literature, 
religious texts are interpreted into Hindutva.”291 
The BJP gained significant ground in the last two decades. The BJP benefits in 
Orissa due to the increasing anti-Congress sentiment, its coalition with the BJD, a local 
party, and the massive network of members through its affiliate organization. In the 2014 
general elections, like in all other states, Orissa also fell for the Modi wave. Modi’s 
message of progress and good governance, and anti-Congress sentiment, resonated with 
people who were looking for change.  
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4. Punjab: Taking Advantage of an Anti-INC Wave  
To access the Pujab electorate, the BJP created a political alliance with the 
dominant local party of Pujab, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), and it supported the SAD 
and majority Sikh community during the INC crushing of the Sikh insurgency and 
condoning the programs against Siksh in Delhi.292 In 1992, the SAD boycotted the 
Punjab Legislative Assembly (PLA) elections; as a result, the INC came to power in a 
landslide victory.293 The new INC administration of Beant Singh stepped up the 
campaign against Sikh insurgents and the SAD leadership. Consequently, the SAD 
activists supported the BJP against the INC in the Delhi elections; hence, both formed an 
alliance. The BJP supported the SAD in its political objectives and rhetoric against the 
INC leadership in Punjab. In the 1997 PLA elections, the BJP and SAD alliance won 93 
out of 117 seats and 48 percent of the vote. Since then, the BJP has been building its 
strong base in the state.294 From Punjab, the BJP won one Lok Sabha seat in 2009 and 
two seats in 2014.  
In the last three decades after its creation, the BJP has made tremendous progress 
in becoming the largest national party and acquiring a clear majority in the Lok Sabha. 
The BJP and its affiliates (the Sangh Parivar) have leveraged a well-planned strategy and 
seamless execution to build their base systematically. The Sangh Parivar masterfully 
exploited the issues around Ram Janmabhoomi and Babri Masjid to unite all Hindus for a 
greater cause. The BJP used all tactics available in the political handbook to create a 
Hindu identity, and successfully organized nationwide yatras, jatras, and other mass 
mobilizing events. The Sangh Parivar has also successfully used the soft power. Up until 
the 1990s, the BJP was unable to expand beyond the Hindi belt. The BJP went on to use 
flexible and tailor-made approaches to gain access to each state. Since coming into power 
in 2014, the BJP continues to be under the microscope and scrutiny by the media and 
opposition alike. The current government policies and their performance in other areas 
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are not within the scope of this thesis but simply illustrated to examine its approach 
towards the Naxalite insurgency. The next section illustrates BJP’s hawkish and 
aggressive demands as an opposition party.  
B. THE BJP: A HAWKISH AND AGGRESSIVE APPROACH AS AN 
OPPOSITION PARTY  
Since the creation of the BJP, the aggressiveness and hawkishness are evident in 
the majority of its political moves. After the independence of India, the INC and Nehru 
made deliberate efforts to build a secular India where all religions could live in harmony. 
However, the BJP consciously uses “a single religion” as its main political weapon to 
create and secure a vote bank. From the beginning, systematically and with a great 
success, the BJP has used the Hindu card to gain support among India’s majority Hindu 
populations. The BJP promotes itself as the only party that can fight and protect the 
Hindu culture and religion. To win support from the majority of the Hindu population, it 
has used both a soft and hard approach.  
The BJP uses craftily inflammatory statements and speeches to provoke anger and 
excitement in its supporters. The case of Ram Janmabhoomi and Babri Masjid is an 
example of assertiveness that resulted in the demolition of a historical mosque. After 
losing the election in 1984, the BJP and its family organizations made the Ram 
Janmabhoomi one of the most important points of its political agenda. It systematically 
increased support for its cause by using multiple aggressive tactics. The BJP with Hindu 
religious and nationalist leaders often held mass rallies, presenting inflammatory 
speeches. Their national leaders, such as Advani and Joshi, launched yatras to gather 
support and to awaken Hindutva. They organized frequent events at the disputed location 
of Ram Janmabhoomi and Babri Masjid. Finally, during one of the biggest VHP 
organized mass gatherings (of more than 200,000 volunteers) on December 6, 1992 to 
construct the Ram Temple, the historical Babri Masjid was tragically demolished.  
The BJP frequently used anti-Muslim and anti-Christian rhetoric to unite and 
inflame the Hindu sentiment. The partisan politics of the BJP often led to confrontation 
and riots between Hindus and Muslims, which caused many people from both sides to 
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lose their lives. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, riots erupted all over India 
between Hindus and Muslims, and more than 2,000 people lost their lives.295 However, 
the focal point rested on the current prime minister but then the chief minister of Gujarat, 
Modi, with his strong RSS roots. As a chief minister, he was continuously accused of 
aggressively dealing with Muslims. On February 27, 2002, 58 Hindu pilgrims killed in an 
attack on a train in Godhra, Gujarat.296 In response, riots broke out between Hindus and 
Muslims, and several hundred people from both communities died within hours while the 
police stood at bay. The INC, and even the U.S. government, accused the BJP, but 
primarily Modi, of promoting and instigating violence against Muslims.297 The BJP also 
promoted violence against India’s Christian minorities. Under the rule of the INC, 
Christians were relatively safe, but during the BJP’s governance, Christians would suffer 
extensive persecutions, which discussed later.  
As an opposition party in the Indian Parliament, the BJP always portrayed and 
demanded that the INC pursue an aggressive foreign policy and harshly deal with 
insurgencies. It had consistently demanded tougher stands on issues, such as the Kashmir 
disputes, as well as dealing with Pakistan, Bangladeshi illegal immigration, China, and 
insurgencies. In the case of Kashmir, the BJP has long advocated the removal of article 
370 of the Indian constitution.298 Article 370 grants special autonomy rights to the state 
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of Jammu and Kashmir, which granted to the state in 1947, right after independence. It 
did not want to give any special concessions to Kashmiris or to any other region.299 The 
BJP always raised questions and blamed the INC for creating for the possibilities for 
insurgencies in the region. The BJP demanded to build a fence on all the international 
borders neighboring Pakistan, and then weed out all foreigners from these territories.300 
The BJP always insisted on removing Article 370 and the distinct advantage provided to 
Jammu and Kashmir; however, after coming to power in 1998, it softened its position, 
although, the BJP continued to use this issue in its election rhetoric.  
Within the Indian federalist states bordering Bangladesh, the BJP has used the 
existing communal tension between native Hindus, Hindu refugees, as well as legal and 
illegal Muslim migrants, in its strategy to gain inroads within the region. The BJP 
promised to build a fence on the borders and remove illegal Muslim migrants, as this 
region is facing a major problem of unrestricted migration from Bangladesh of both 
Hindu and Muslim migrants. The BJP makes a distinction between Hindu and Muslim 
migrants, considering “the Hindus who cross over from Bangladesh are ‘refugees, fleeing 
from religious persecution,’ and the Muslims who cross over are without [any] exception, 
illegal infiltrators with malevolent intents.”301 The BJP has demanded (and promised) to 
build a fence and control the borders to halt illegal migration. The BJP took a similar 
position on China before coming to power. Modi and other leaders criticized China’s 
aggressive policies demanding a strong response from the previous governments. Every 
time insurgent groups attacks and kill government security forces or a large number of 
civilians, the BJP is swift to condemn the violence. At the same time, the BJP demanded 
“the Government to crush the violence stringently ... [and] would have to take strong 
measures to ward off such barbaric attacks and there can be no leniency shown to such 
ghastly killers.”302  
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From the beginning of its birth from the BJS, the BJP has shown aggressiveness, 
polarization, and partisan politics, which reflected during its time as an opposition party. 
To establish a Hindu nation, the BJP used a rightwing Hindu nationalist strategy, as 
reflected in its strong and aggressive stands. It promoted a hawkish approach towards 
Muslims and Christians, and the Jammu and Kashmir regions. However, it is different to 
be on the opposition and to demand, than in taking actual steps when in power. 
Therefore, the next couple of sections shed light on the BJP’s approach as a ruling party.  
C. THE BJP’S APPROACH AS A RULING PARTY 
In the 1998 elections, the BJP won 182 out of 543 parliamentary seats to become 
the largest party; hence, under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP was able 
to form a government in the center.303 The BJP quickly figured out two different things, 
to use inflammatory rhetoric as an opposition party and to make flamboyant promises 
during the electoral process. Since the BJP needed 273 seats for a majority to form the 
government, it needed substantial support from the other parties to form an alliance. As 
Matthew Blake Fehrs suggests:  
The BJP ran on a Hindu nationalist platform that included references to 
Kashmir as well as the status of Muslims in India. However, in order to 
cobble together a coalition, the BJP were forced to make concessions to 
their governing partners, perhaps most significantly renouncing their 
desire to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution that granted Jammu and 
Kashmir special status.304 
These types of changes within the BJP policies and approach were observed 
throughout its tenure. Prime Minister Vajpayee was a more moderate and secular face of 
the party, which its coalition partners accepted, and Home Minister L. K. Advani was a 
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hard-liner who satisfied its Hindu nationalist hardline affiliates, such as the RSS and the 
VHP.305  
In the Indian political system, the BJP portrayed its image as “a Hindu nationalist 
party with hawkish views on foreign [and domestic] policy.”306 The BJP used rhetoric 
against Muslims in India and against Pakistan. The BJP, like its predecessor the BJS, 
heavily criticized any dealings with Pakistan and wanted to have nuclear weapons. Since 
the BJP had to compromise on repealing Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, to 
conciliate hardliners within the party and its family organizations, the Vajpayee 
government conducted its first nuclear test on May 11, 1998, weathering worldwide 
condemnation and retaliatory nuclear tests from Pakistan.307 Between 1998 and 2004, the 
BJP government continued to announce aggressive policies and harsh rhetoric against the 
Kashmiri terrorists. The BJP announced “a policy of ‘hot pursuit’ of terrorists into 
Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.”308 In addition, as a home minister, Advani announced a 
new approach to “deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile designs and activities 
in Kashmir.”309  
From 1998 to 2004, during the BJP-led NDA government, violence against 
India’s Christian minority saw an upsurge, and since 2014, it has again dramatically 
increased after the Modi-led BJP government came to power. According to Chris Ogden, 
“Violence against Christians during the BJP-led NDA involved the setting fire of prayer 
halls, churches, shops and houses during December 1998 and, most infamously, on 27 
January 1999, the burning to death by Hindu extremists of an Australian missionary, 
Graham Staines, and his two sons.”310 Ogden also argues, “Much of this violence 
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stemmed from the Christian conversion of Hindus and the presence of Christian 
missionaries in tribal areas.”311 
Again, the BJP and its sister organizations were becoming active after coming 
back into power in 2014. In 2015, according to the World Watch Monitor, “The country 
saw 355 incidents of violence, including 200 major incidents, during the last year [2015] 
… Seven pastors were killed, nuns were raped and hundreds of Christians were arrested 
under India’s anti-conversions laws.”312 By mid-2016, more than 134 attacks reported 
against Christians and their churches.313 Prime Minster Modi has yet to condemn these 
attacks on Christians. Hence, the BJP government is using an aggressive approach 
towards minorities, most of the time indirectly, using its affiliates.  
Since coming to power in 2014, the Modi government aggressively approaches 
the extremists in the east and west, even if that meant crossing international borders. 
India’s most northeastern state of Nagaland shares an international border with Myanmar. 
Since pre-independence, the Naga people have been seeking a “sovereign Naga state.” A 
“greater Naga area,” comprising “all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas,” along with 
Nagaland would include several Indian states and a large tract of Myanmar, which is 
about eight times greater than the current Nagaland.314 The NSCN (I-M) and the National 
Socialist Council of Nagalim(Khaplang) are the current insurgent organizations with a 
strong military outfit. After carrying out terrorist attacks in India, Naga insurgents hide in 
the neighboring Myanmar jungles, a perfect hideout for them. In 2015, the Indian Army 
conducted a cross-international border operation in Myanmar that targeted the Naga 
insurgent military camps in retaliation for 18 soldiers killed in Manipur.315 In September 
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2016, a terrorist attacked an Indian Army base in Kashmir that killed 18 soldiers.316 In 
retaliation, the Indian Army carried out a “surgical strike” on other side of the line of 
control, the Pakistani controlled Kashmir, causing “significant damage to terrorists.” 
These cross-borders strikes show the willingness of Modi’s government to deal 
aggressively with insurgencies.  
The hawkish nature of the BJP party is evident at all given opportunities. During 
1998–2004, the BJP was the largest party but it did not have a clear majority, and as such, 
had to rely on other parties for support. Consequently, it was not able to execute all the 
hardline agenda it set forth, and as a result, pulled closer to the center. However, at all 
opportune occasions, the BJP displays its hawkish nature evident in conducting nuclear 
tests, actions against Muslim and Christian minorities, and in dealing with the Kashmiri 
insurgency. Since 2014, the BJP’s Modi government has had a clear mandate and no 
obligation to other parties; it has promptly revealed an increasingly aggressive stand on 
many issues and policies. It does not falter from targeting insurgents in neighboring 
countries either. The next section discusses the current approach and policies of the Modi 
government towards the Naxalites.  
D. THE BJP’S APPROACH TOWARD THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
On May 26, 2014, Chief Minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi assumed the Office 
of the Prime Minister of India. Currently, his government is nearly 30 months old; it may 
be a bit premature to say what the impact of his polices and approach on both the 
domestic and international level over long term is, but studying them provides a general 
idea of the direction the Modi government. This section examines its dealing with the 
Naxalite insurgency; however, it will take a long time to see the real effect of its policies. 
The Naxalite insurgency is one of oldest in India, and as such, it has a very strong 
narrative about fighting for social and economic inequality for the tribal and Dalit people. 
It has spread to more than 40 percent of the country (mostly in remote and tough terrains) 
and has survived several governments and their efforts; therefore, the Modi government 
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must come up with a very distinct and effective approach to make a distinct 
transformation. The Modi government includes lessons learned from the past when 
drafting a “new multi-pronged ‘National Policy and Action Plan to address Left Wing 
Extremism,’ aimed at eliminating the menace in the ‘shortest possible timeframe by using 
any element of the country’s national power.’”317 In addition, in May 2015, Modi 
became the first Prime Minister to visit the Naxalite’s worst-hit area, Dantewada in 
Chhattisgarh, which was never done by the INC prime minister.318 This action shows 
Modi’s priority in dealing with the Naxalites. However, Lalwani argues, “those expecting 
Prime Minister Modi’s government to overhaul the existing strategy—his plan to tinker at 
the margins notwithstanding—should not hold their breath.”319 This section covers the 
current policies of Modi’s government in detail and its immediate impact on the 
insurgency.  
Even though Modi and the BJP ran an aggressive election campaign and declared 
a “zero tolerance” policy towards Naxalites,320 it took a softer approach in the actual 
implementation. It is walking in the same footsteps of its predecessors, as recognizing the 
Naxalite insurgents as “‘misguided’ people who only rebel ‘tactically.’”321 Previous 
governments have treated the Naxalites quite differently from other insurgencies, such as 
in Kashmir and Nagaland; the current government is doing the same. Many Indian 
leaders have “describe[d] them in inclusive language—‘backward Hindus’ and ‘true 
Indians,’ … as ‘our children’ and … ‘Naxals are our own people,’”322 which requires 
relatively restraint and selective action against them. The current Indian government 
describes the Maoists as “some sections of the society, especially the younger generation, 
have romantic illusions about the Maoists, arising out of an incomplete understanding of 
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their ideology.”323 Previous governments have approached this viewpoint with 
comparatively “limited” military actions, as well as half-hearted development programs 
plagued with significant corruption and insurgent extortion that have led to limited 
success.324 However, the BJP wants to continue most of this scheme, not in limited 
scope, but with tough measures and a full throttle approach into dealing with the Naxalite 
threat.  
Hence, the BJP has announced a multi-pronged counterinsurgency strategy, 
considered as being “balanced, holistic and robust”325 designed to win the hearts and 
minds of the tribal and other marginalized populations.326 At the same time, the 
government will consider peace talks with the Maoists if they lay down their arms and 
declare trust in the democratic system and process.327 Modi appointed Rajnath Singh as 
Union Minister of Home Affairs, who also started his career through the Hindu rightwing 
organization RSS and is famous for his strong stance. The first step Rajnath Singh took 
was to change the name from Naxal Management division to Left Wing Extremism 
(LWE) division, in an effort to include a large number of communist insurgent groups.328 
Singh describes his anti-Naxalite strategy as, “It is a balanced approach where on the one 
hand our effort is to bring the Adivasi into the mainstream and on the other, to strictly 
deal with those who indulge in violence.”329 Under the new doctrine, the Modi 
government planned to set up an oversight mechanism different from the previous INC-
led governments, a group of five ministers, “Singh as the chairperson, with Finance, 
Tribal, Rural Development, Panchayati Raj and Environment and Forest Ministers as 
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members.”330 The BJP’s approach is distinctively different from the previous 
government’s approach. The BJP emphasizes achieving “short-term goals” in its effort to 
tackle the LWE problem.331 The Modi government counterinsurgency strategy against 
the Naxalites includes a hand-in-hand dual-prong approach; one prong is to use security 
forces to establish security, and the second is to provide development measures to win 
hearts and minds. Previous governments used the similar strategies, but due to a lack of 
coordination and uneven implementation between affected states, it produced mixed 
results. According to a government source, “The focus of the Government is to address 
security, development and governance deficits in 106 LWE district especially the 35 most 
affected LWE districts spread in 7 States.”332 
1. Role of Security Forces in Establishing Security  
One of the primary approaches of the Modi government is to establish security in 
the regions hit by the LWE, which appears to be the use of a stronger language than the 
previous INC-led government’s policies. To establish security, the government is 
focusing on the four main aspects that include increasing troop levels to recommended 
levels, increasing incentives and benefits for government officers and security personnel 
to attract and retain talent, improving intelligence gathering and sharing, and fortifying 
and increasing the number of police stations. This approach also includes strengthening 
the unified command in each affected state and including officers from the security forces 
and civilian administrations in the planning committee, to plan effective 
counterinsurgency policies.333  
Currently, about 92,000 troops from more than 100 Central Armed Police Forces 
(CAPF) battalions and 9,000 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) 
battalion personnel are deployed to the Naxalite insurgency affected areas, in addition to 
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security forces of each federalist state security forces.334 The government would like to 
deploy 10 additional battalions and CoBRA teams by the end of the year and increase 
more in the coming years.335 It is also planning to “expedite the creation of an 
engineering wing in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the lead 
counterinsurgency force in these areas.”336 The government’s strategy is to fill the 
security vacuum to provide development within these areas. This development can be 
accomplished through an increase in recruiting the local tribal youth in CAPF and in 
filling vacancies within state security forces. The government also would like to attract 
more recruits from other parts of India and fill the key positions in government and 
security forces with talented and competent officers. Therefore, the government decided 
to provide more incentives and benefits, which is a continuation of the previous 
government’s approach but supported with better resources this time around. 
Inspired by the U.S. Armed Forces and Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhound forces 
models, the government announced special incentives and benefits to government and 
security personnel serving in the dangerous LWE affected areas to attract competent 
personnel.337 The government first flagged the LWE areas as the “most dangerous zone’ 
in the country as an incentive.338 That designation allowed the government to increase 
the hardship allowance to security forces deployed in these regions.339 The incentives 
and benefits include “special monetary benefits, out-of-turn promotions … choice posting 
after the completion of their tenure in these ‘dangerous’ places, [exposure visits abroad 
and central deputation].”340  
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Counterinsurgency operations can only become successful if supported by good 
intelligence information; hence, the government recognized the problem and decided to 
strengthen the intelligence program. To boost the intelligence collection, the government 
had to invest in all five types of intelligence information sources: signal, imagery, 
measurement and signature, human-source, and open source information.341 Therefore, 
the government decided to strengthen the intelligence setup of the affected states, to 
increase the police to population ratio, and boost the basic policing.342 At the same time, 
the CAPF and the state security forces are provided with the “capability for using 
small/micro UAVs that can be launched from the battalion/district headquarters and 
remotely operated vehicles to defuse IEDs.”343 The government emphasized improving 
the inter-state coordination and intelligence sharing to prevent the Naxalites from 
escaping. However, this approach is not new; instead, it is using the already existing 
strategy implemented by the previous government and is trying to make it more agile.  
The government also wants to help each Indian state affected by the Naxalites by 
providing funding to strengthen their police stations’ security. All the aforementioned 
problems have occurred due to the unsecured police stations. Most of the LWE affected 
areas’ police stations were ill equipped and unsecure, and Naxalites insurgents frequently 
and easily attacked those. The government has already fortified about 300 hundred police 
stations (out of a planned 400), and plans to add another 250 fortified police stations 
throughout the worst-hit districts.344 This fortification will help increase the presence of 
police forces and strengthen counterinsurgency capabilities. In addition, the government 
is streamlining the surrender program and providing funding to each state for the 
“rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrender in accordance with the 
surrender and rehabilitation policy of the State Government.”345 
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2. Provide Development Measures to Win Hearts and Minds 
Nearly all effective counterinsurgency strategies include rectifying the root cause 
of the insurgency, which includes economic and social developments. Social and 
economic injustice are perceived as the root causes of the Naxalite insurgency. Therefore, 
the Modi government has announced a holistic approach, which includes development 
measures to deal with social and economic injustice to compliment the security efforts. 
Developmental measures include implementing better infrastructure development, 
improving and providing basic services, and recognizing the tribal contribution to the 
Indian society.  
The government infrastructure improvement projects include rail and road 
connectivity and establishing a better communication network. Singh also emphasized 
“completing the existing development projects in Naxalite-hit areas, including 
construction of 5,[6]00km roads [and 48 bridges] at a cost of Rs.10,000 crore 
[approximately US$ 1500 million] and setting up of 2,199 mobile phone towers at a cost 
of Rs. 3,000 crore [US$ 450 million].”346 Improved connectivity for both transportation 
and communication will increase the economy of the region, as well as the combat 
effectiveness of the security efforts. Under the integrated action plan (IAP), the 
government will give Rs. 30 crore (US$ 45 million) for the 88 worst-hit districts, to be 
distributed to development works by a committee comprising district magistrates, the 
Superintendent of Police, and the district forest officer, which is different from the UPA 
government’s district-wide approach.347 The goal behind this approach is to bring 
economic development to the remote regions.  
The government is also focusing on social development by providing basic 
services so that the area does not become a recruitment base for the LWE. In the new 
development plan, the government is proposing to setup a development hub in three to 
four locations in each of the worst affected districts to build or improve schools, 
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hospitals, and the public distribution system (PDS).348 Sing also “asked the officials to 
review the policy under which forest lands are given to landless tribal so that ‘pattas’ 
[piece of land] can be given to genuine applicants after showing leniency.”349 The 
government plans to bring more tribal people into the mainstream by recognizing the 
Adivasi icons and their contribution to society by naming airports and roads after them, 
and celebrating their anniversaries.350 This strategy is more inclusive than that of 
previous governments.  
3. Is There Any Impact on the Naxalite Insurgency?  
Since the Modi government came to power in May 2014, the number of violent 
incidents and deaths related to the Naxalite’s insurgency has relatively decreased. In 
2015, the Naxalite violence was at its lowest in years, but it has been creeping back up in 
the current year. Either way, according to Thomas F. Lynch, the BJP should not get all 
the credit for the decrease in violence because this declining trend began in 2012 because 
of the previous government’s counterinsurgency policies. Lynch summarized the 
situation carefully but accurately stated, “in 2016 the Naxalite insurgency in eastern India 
remains a security factor, but one far from the menace publicly announced by then–Prime 
Minister Singh in 2006 and again in 2010.”351 Tables 2 to 4 show the data on the 
Naxalite’s violence of the last five years.  
In 2010, the Naxalite’s insurgency reached its peak, with the total number of 
people killed reported as 1,180 (626 civilians, 277 security force personnel, and 277 
insurgents), which prompted then-Prime Minister Singh to declare the Naxalites a 
national security threat, again.352 The government started serious counterinsurgency 
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efforts, which resulted in a reduction in violence. From 2010 to 2015, the total number of 
deaths significantly decreased by 79 percent (Table 2). Also, from 2011 to 2015, the total 
numbers of incidents related to the LWE decreased by 38 percent (Table 3). According to 
Table 3, while the Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha states remain the worst affected 
by the LWE violence, however, West Bengal reported zero incidents and deaths. 
According to Table 4, the number of LWE cadres arrested remains high and an increasing 
number of rebels are surrendering (that is positive sign). Telangana, a newly created state, 
has been experiencing some violence in the last few years.  
Table 3.   Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism: 2005–2006, India Year Wise 
Breakup.353 
 
* Data until October 23, 2016 
                                                 







2005 281 150 286 717
2006 266 128 343 737
2007 240 218 192 650
2008 220 214 214 648
2009 391 312 294 997
2010 626 277 277 1180
2011 275 128 199 602
2012 146 104 117 367
2013 159 111 151 421
2014 128 87 99 314
2015 93 57 101 251
2016 100 59 178 337
Total* 2925 1845 2451 7221
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Table 4.   State-wise Extent of LWE Violence during 2011 to 2016 (up to 
October 15, 2016).354 
 
* Figures in bracket show details of the corresponding periods of 2015 
* Reported up to October 15, 2016 and it is tentative 
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accessed November 6, 2016, http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/Lweviolance_28102016.PDF.  
Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths
Andhra 
Pradesh 54 9 67 13 28 7 18 4 35 8 16 (26) 6 (7)
Bihar 316 63 166 44 177 69 163 32 109 17 112 (90) 26 (13)
Chhattisgar
h 465 204 370 109 355 111 328 112 466 101 326 (371) 93 (83)
Jharkhand 517 182 480 163 387 152 384 103 310 56 275 (266) 71 (51)
M.P. 8 0 11 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 10 (0) 1 (0)
Maharashtra 109 54 134 41 71 19 70 28 55 18 63 (48) 19 (14)
Odisha 192 53 171 45 101 35 103 26 92 28 69 (77) 19 (24)
Telangana NA 8 4 14 5 11 2 6 (7) 0 (1)
Uttar 
Pradesh 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 (0)
West Bengal 92 45 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0(0)
Others 6 1 8 0 7 0 8 0 10 0 5 (3) 0 (0)
Total 1760 611 1415 415 1136 397 1091 310 1088 230 882 (888) 235 (193)
State 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*
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Table 5.   Comparative Important Parameters of LWE Violence during 2011 to 
2016.355 
 
* Figures in bracket show details of the corresponding periods of 2015 
* Reported up to October 15, 2016, and it is tentative 
 
In the current year 2016 until October, both the number of total incidents and 
deaths related to the LWE have increased a little bit, which could be concerning. 
According to the data, the new BJP government had some immediate impact on the 
insurgency, and it looked like a turn around, but there are signs of increasing violence. 
Although the highest increase is seen in the worst-hit areas, such as Jharkhand and 
Chhattisgarh, the overall picture is otherwise relatively similar to 2015. The most positive 
news about the insurgency is the number of surrenders. In 2016, the number of the 
Naxalite insurgents surrendering increased three fold compared to the previous year. In 
addition, the number of attacks on security forces and personnel deaths is also 
significantly down, as well as weapons looting. Overall, the new counterinsurgency 
policies seem to be working.  
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Sr. No. Parameters 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
A Number of Incidents 1760 1415 1316 1091 1088 882 (888)
Civilians killed 469 301 282 222 171 176 (139)
(Out of which Police informers 
killed) 218 134 113 91 92 97 (72)
C Number of Security Forces Killed 142 114 115 88 59 59(54)
D Number of encounters with Police 223 216 218 221 247 277 (182)
E
Number of attack on police 
(including land mines) 131 135 143 155 118 93 (104)
F
Number of LWE Cadre killed (during 
encoutners as well as attacks on 
police) 99 74 100 63 89 157(64)
G Number of LWE Cadre arrested 2030 1901 1397 1696 1668 1492 (1301)
H Number of LWE Cadre Surrendered 394 445 282 676 570 1277 (340)
I Total number of arms snatched 67 55 89 58 18 3 (18)
J Total number of arms recovered 636 591 628 548 723 644 (561)
K Arms training camps held 84 53 27 34 18 14 (15)




In 1980, after its creation, the BJP systematically worked to build its base over the 
last three decades, and finally was able to come to power on its own in 2014. The BJP’s 
main political platform is based on the Hindutva, but it had to revise its strategy based on 
the political, social, and economic environment according to each Indian federalist state 
to win other reluctant supporters. In 2014, the main reasons the BJP came to power were 
due to the relative failure of the previous INC-led government, its broad agenda, and 
most importantly, the popularity of its prime ministerial candidate Modi. Modi and the 
BJP were known for their hawkish approach and hardline rhetoric against minorities, 
neighbors, and almost all other issues involving insurgency. Therefore, Modi’s 
government expected to deal with the Naxalite insurgency very aggressively and 
decisively. However, as per past-experience in 1998–2004, the BJP-led NDA coalition 
ruled more dovish than hawkish because of not having a clear majority and its reliance on 
the other parties.  
Modi’s government has taken a holistic and balanced approach into dealing with 
the Naxalite insurgency. The new government quickly realized that an aggressive military 
solution is not the only answer to solve this five-decades-old insurgency. The government 
designed a multipronged approach, from boosting the number of deployed security forces 
to developing a grassroots base. It focuses more on improving its governance and in 
providing security. At the same time, the Modi government has promised to invest large 
sums of money into the development of LWE affected areas. The government has also 
focused on dealing with the worst-hit areas first. To attract competent personnel, it is 
increasing the incentives and benefits for the government and security forces. Also, the 
government is offering attractive “surrendering packages” for the rebels willing to put 
down their arms. Most importantly, the government has taken the Naxalite problem very 
seriously, and is applying concrete steps in the counterinsurgency process. It appears that 
the insurgency is coming under control and the situation has improved significantly 
compared to 2010 due to the previous government’s policies and the current 
government’s improved policies. Out of all the states affected by the Naxalite insurgency, 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are the worst-hit states; Bihar and Odisha are next in line. If 
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the current government can effectively implement all the plans and policies it has 
designed, then the Maoist movement’s days are apparently numbered.  
Although known for its hawkish and aggressive approach, the BJP’s dealings with 
the Naxalite insurgency are anything but hawkish. In fact, its approach is more in line 
with proper counterinsurgency response theories proposed by many counterinsurgency 
experts, such as Galula, Nagl, and Kholi. It appears the BJP’s election rhetoric and 
aggressive approach when in opposition, is an electoral strategy to win voter support and 
show toughness, but when it actually comes to execution, it operates more towards the 
center. The politics of reality is the only explanation for the BJP’s change in behavior 
from more hawkish to dovish. After coming to power, the BJP probably realized that if it 
wants to govern effectively, it does need support from the opposition and other parties. It 
realized that making far right decisions and having hawkish policies might alienate the 
majority of the moderate voters. The BJP must have also realized that the problem looks 
a lot different as a ruling party then as an opposition party. In addition, the BJP and other 
political parties do not treat the Naxalites as outsiders compared to the Kashmiri and 
Naga insurgencies. They always treated the Naxals as “our own people,” “backward 
Hindu,” “true Indian,” etc., which thus requires a softer approach. All these reasons may 
have caused the BJP to pull closer to the center from the right. Overall, the current BJP 
government’s policies are more dovish than hawkish.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis examined the Naxalite insurgency and its long history of surviving 
through multiple administrations in New Delhi and each affected state for more than six 
decades. However, the main research topic for this thesis was to analyze the current BJP 
government’s policies and approaches toward the Naxalite insurgency, as it is a more 
hawkish party. The goal was to find out the differences in policies and approaches, if any, 
between the BJP and previous governments led by the INC in dealing with the Naxalite 
insurgency. This thesis also examined multiple other factors that could have influenced 
and shaped the BJP policies including political settings and priorities, and Hindu 
nationalist ideology. The ultimate goal was to see if the BJP’s hawkish and aggressive 
rhetoric during elections and demands as an opposition party translated into policies or 
not. The first section is about the Naxalite insurgency. The second section is about the 
previous governments’ counterinsurgency approach. The third section addresses the 
BJP’s policies and approach. The final section provides a few policy recommendations.  
A. THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
The Naxalite insurgency is a great example of a classical insurgency, which 
shows how an insurgency starts and becomes resilient, just as described by 
counterinsurgency experts. As Connable and Libicki suggested, when a government 
ignores the rising dissent in a particular group or community of people, discontent 
eventually builds up and leads to an insurgency.356 Suppressive political and economic 
systems multiplied by bad governance have suppressed and unjustly treated these people, 
which is what exactly happened with the Naxalite insurgency in last six decades. It is 
successful in establishing a resilient armed struggle and is deeply rooted in the Dalit and 
mostly tribal communities.  
Most of these communities are very poor and have been marginalized over the 
years. For more than two centuries, the British colonizer and Indian governments largely 
ignored these areas and people. However, actions or the lack of actions by the Indian 
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governments contributed the most to exacerbating this problem. Since these areas were 
economically and politically insignificant for the central governments, they were slow to 
bring development to these areas and recognize widespread dissent. People supporting 
the Maoists feel socially, politically and economically suppressed, and unjustly treated 
over the years. The central and state governments for one or more reasons displaced these 
communities from their ancestor’s home and land without providing an acceptable 
solution; as a result, these communities have lost their livelihood and source of income. 
As Banerjee described, the Adivasi and Dalits have experienced “widespread 
displacement, forest issues, insecure tenancies, and other forms of exploitation like usury, 
land alienation and imperfect market condition.”357 They have mostly remained 
uneducated, the least developed, and poor compared to the rest of India. As a result, these 
communities provided support to the Maoist movement, as well as became a recruiting 
pool for it over the last six decades.  
The Maoists were successful in recognizing a depressed, deprived, and 
discontented people in these poor communities, and were able to provide them a voice 
and political platform to express their anger and frustration through violent rebellion. The 
Maoists also provided a common identity of a destitute economic class to unite tribal and 
the Dalit people in the fight against economic and social injustice; hence, undermining 
their other identities, such as religion, caste, and language. Even though most of the 
radical leaders, activists, and intellectuals came from an urban educated middle and upper 
class, the Maoists treated the Dalit people, untouchables, and tribal people equally 
(without any religious or caste prejudice and hierarchy) when they joined their ranks.358 
The Naxal guru, Majumdar , and his comrades worked and lived with indigenous people 
for years and were successful in earning their trust and establishing an economic class 
identity for poor and landless peasants. Thus, the Maoists were able to recognize 
frustration and dissent in these communities due to a lack of representation and 
acceptance of their identity, and they were able to mobilize them to confront state 
authority for justice. 
                                                 
357 Banerjee, “On the Naxalite Movement: A Report with a Difference,” 11.  
358 Gupta, “The Naxalites and the Maoist Movement in India,” 171. 
 97 
B. THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS’ APPROACH 
The previous central and federalist state governments’ counterinsurgency efforts 
mostly relied on heavy police actions rather than winning the hearts and minds of the 
populace. In addition, the Maoists created a narrative that the government was not out to 
help poor and disadvantaged people but just to control them and steal their resources. 
Hence, the governments’ actions fell right into their narratives and helped their cause. 
Whatever efforts done by the governments to provide a life of dignity and honor failed 
due to widespread corruption within the system, and unsympathetic behavior of the 
governments’ officials towards the poor and neglected tribal and Dalit people.359 As 
Connable and Libicki argued, military actions result in civilian casualties and suffering, 
which can further fuel anti-government sentiments and cumulate in support for 
insurgency groups among the local people.360 The Maoists did exactly that; they used 
police brutality and suppression for their recruiting propaganda, which resulted in 
enhancing support among these communities for their armed struggle.  
C. THE BJP COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
As a ruling party, the BJP is not hawkish at all while designing and implementing 
counterinsurgency policies towards the Naxalites; instead, it has shown an approach that 
is more pragmatic. Over the years, the BJP has used aggressive tactics and hawkish 
behavior to establish its base support and to attract followers from all walks of life. As a 
result, in 2014, the BJP gained a clear majority and formed the government in the center. 
However, after reviewing the BJP’s polices in dealing with the Naxalite insurgency, its 
approach is more logical and practical, as shown in its multipronged strategy. The Modi 
government is pursing the “balanced, holistic and robust”361 counterinsurgency strategy 
by focusing on providing security, good governance, and development programs 
(winning the hearts and minds).  
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The BJP has implemented an ambitious, aggressive, and well-rounded 
multipronged counterinsurgency strategy that includes security, good governance, 
development, peace talks, and amnesty. The BJP’s strategy is to bring stability and peace 
to the affected regions by providing security, which would create an environment for 
needed development and good governance. It also does not want to rule out any peace 
talk opportunities with the Maoists who are willing to denounce violence. The BJP has a 
good amnesty program, which attracts loosely affiliated and semi-committed followers 
and fighters to surrender and join the mainstream. However, it has failed to persuade 
hardcore fighters and leaders to surrender.  
However, the BJP faces many challenges to implement its counterinsurgency 
strategy because of the immense area covered by this insurgency. The BJP’s main 
challenge is to coordinate effectively with all the affected states’ governments, because 
all, except one, have non-BJP governments. All the ruling parties in their respective states 
have their own political and economic agendas that may or may not fit well with the 
BJP’s strategy. In addition, demography, geography, and other factors, such as ethnicity, 
languages, etc., are very different in each state. Therefore, what works in one state or area 
does not mean it will work in another. Hence, the BJP has to come up with a tailor-made 
approach for each region rather than having one big umbrella strategy. In addition, the 
central and state governments are still struggling to fill vacancies in security forces and 
other government positions, especially, in highly volatile areas. Other challenges include 
corruption, violent armed groups, such as Salwa Judum, and multinational corporations’ 
unlawful practices, which continue to create dissent in indigenous people and undermine 
the governments’ other efforts.  
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
If the current BJP government wants its counterinsurgency strategy to be 
successful, then it needs to bring sweeping social, economic, and political changes in the 
affected region. The government has already acknowledged that the Naxalite insurgency 
is a credible threat but it has to solve the underlying causes of discontent by 
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implementing time sensitive solutions with total commitment.362 All efforts should come 
from legitimate government sources recognized by the indigenous people, which mean 
using local solutions for local problems. The government should think about a long-term 
commitment with a long-term impact and stay away from short-term solutions, such as 
arming local militia. Since this insurgency has spread to more than 40 percent of India, 
and is located in very remote areas, the central government must implement coordinated 
efforts including all affected states’ governments and their agencies. Intelligence is one of 
the most important parts of the counterinsurgency efforts; the governments should focus 
on tapping into locals who are against the insurgency for collecting vital intelligence.  
All involved governments should steer away from emphasizing only military 
solutions rather than give importance to political solutions. According to the U.S. 
counterinsurgency manual, primary efforts must consider an 80 percent political solution 
and refrain from using military actions as much as possible.363 Only military solutions 
alienate the majority of the populations by fomenting more dissent and anger, which can 
be counterproductive. By accommodating political representation and addressing 
grievances, the central government will be able to narrow the recruiting pool for the 
insurgents. If the government is able to create safe zones for affected communities, it will 
be able to isolate the insurgents, which can prove detrimental to insurgents’ narrative and 
resources. The counterinsurgency process takes a long time to have a meaningful impact. 
It is a slow and prolonged process, especially for insurgencies, such as the Naxalites. 
Hence, the governments must make a long-term commitment for the overall 
counterinsurgency process and for individual solutions.  
Many large natural resources are located in the Naxalite affected areas, and the 
government should use these resources to its advantage to win Naxalites’ hearts and 
minds. The government needs to provide better oversight and direction to multinational 
corporations mining in these regions. It needs to mandate that each corporation invest 25 
percent or more of its profit into developing these regions. These corporations must give 
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preference to local populations for employment and provide them fair wages. The 
government needs to compensate these indigenous people properly and justly for the loss 
of their land and livelihood. Thus far, it seems that the BJP government is on the right 
track and has the right approach and intent. However, time will tell how much long-term 
impact its strategy and commitment is able to produce. When it comes to policy 
implementation, the BJP government is more pragmatic than hawkish.  
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